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"LET CONGRESS DO IT": THE CASE FOR 
AN ABSOLUTE RULE OF STATUTORY 
-STARE DECISISt 
Lawrence C. Marshall* 
The sporadic way that various members of the Supreme Court and 
the legal community treat the principle of stare decisis is increasingly 
striking.1 At times, the rule of stare decisis appears to be trotted out in 
defense of decisions that were actually reached on quite independent 
grounds. At other times, the dictates of the rule appear to be casually 
ignored when other factors call for the overruling of a precedent. It is 
tempting, therefore, to dismiss the rule of stare decisis as a mere rhe-
torical device, much like the question of whether a Supreme Court 
nominee's judicial philosophy is an appropriate subject of senatorial 
inquiry.2 For example, in the 1960s, when the Warren Court was in 
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1. As used in this article, stare decisis refers to the concept of horizontal stare decisis, rather 
than vertical stare decisis. See Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare 
Decisis, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 81-82 (L. Goldstein ed. 1987). Vertical stare decisis is the rule 
binding a lower court to adhere to the decisions of higher courts in its jurisdiction. For example, 
a federal district court is generally considered duty bound to attempt faithfully to apply the 
precedents of the Supreme Court and of the court of appeals for the circuit in which it sits. 
Horizontal stare decisis - the rule followed by a court in dealing with its own prior decisions -
is quite different. In this country, there has been no unbending rule obliging a court to adhere to 
iti< earlier precedents. Instead, it is the recognized authority of a court to overrule its earlier 
rulings. The "[Supreme] Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a 
doctrine of disability at self-correction." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (foot-
note omitted). See generally Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of the 
Case, 21 TEXAS L. REV. 514, 523 (1943). 
2. See Califano, The '68 Version of the Bork Debate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at A19, col. 
2 (describing Republican opposition to the nomination of Justice Fortas to be Chief Justice); A 
Side-Bar Battle, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1987, at Al4, col. 1 (describing partisan attempts to dis-
credit positions taken by Senators Strom Thurmond and Edward Kennedy regarding the Bork 
nomination, by comparing those positions with the ones they had taken previously with respect 
to the nominations of Abe Fortas and Abner Mikva); see also Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and 
Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 49 (1989). 
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its most activist stage, conservative critics routinely attacked the 
Court's willingness to overrule or ignore precedent.3 In the 1980s, by 
contrast, it is the liberal critics who tend to attack conservative major-
ities of the Court for failing to adhere to stare decisis, 4 accusing them 
of abandoning their conservatism. 5 A recent assistant attorney general 
of the United States went so far as to claim that "stare decisis has 
always been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liber-
als. Its friends, for the most part, are determined by the needs of the 
moment. " 6 The spate of recent overrulings 7 adds support to this de-
piction of the rule. 
Sometimes, though, the Court actually seems to consider itself 
bound to adhere to a precedent because of the stare decisis principle. 
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 8 for example, the Court shocked 
the legal community by unanimously reaffirming Runyon v. McCrary, 9 
a case extending the reach of an important civil rights statute to pri-
vate acts of discrimination. Although five Justices earlier had an-
nounced their intention to reconsider Runyon, 10 the Court's ultimate 
decision was a hearty endorsement of stare decisis. The Court extolled 
the values the rule serves, and the role it plays in helping the courts in 
the "difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential sys-
3. See, e.g., Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright, The ''Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. er. REV. 211; 
Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term - Foreword: ''Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to 
the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government'~ 18 HARV. L. REV. 143, 169-75 
(1964). 
4. "The Court's determination now to reach out to reconsider [Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160 (1976)) and everything that has been built upon it, is neither restrained, nor judicious, nor 
consistent with the accepted doctrine of stare decisis." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, I 08 S. 
Ct. 1419, 1421 (1988) (Blackmun, J., with whom Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, 
dissenting from order that case be reargued); see also Kennedy, Justices to Hear Challenge to Bias 
Ruling, Boston Globe, Oct. 12, 1988, at 3 (describing liberal reaction to Court's decision to 
reconsider Runyon). 
5. Charles Cooper rhetorically asks whether it is not "amusing that liberals, who only re-
cently have perceived the profound value of 'stability of the law,' have taken to lecturing conser-
vatives on what it takes to be a true conservative?" Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and 
Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 401 (1988). 
Such labels ignore the difficulty of defining what is a ''judicial conservative" or what consti-
tutes ''judicial restraint." Some define a judge as conservative or restrained if she "adheres to a 
very strict doctrine of stare decisis." Wasserstrom, The Empire's New Clothes (Book Review), 75 
GEO. L.J. 199, 294 (1986). Others, such as Judge Richard Posner, argue that judicial restraint 
describes a judge's unwillingness to reject decisions of the political branches, and has little, or 
nothing, to do with adherence to precedent. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS 
AND REFORM 207-10 (1985). 
6. Cooper, supra note 5, at 402 (footnote omitted). 
7. See infra notes 26 & 36. 
8. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). 
9. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
10. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (ordering parties to brief 
and argue "(w]hether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in 
Runyon v. McCrory •.. should be reconsidered"). 
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tem that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discretion.' " 11 What makes 
the case so meaningful is the Court's concession that some of its Jus-
tices continued to believe that "Runyon was decided incorrectly,"12 
and the strong sense that the decision reached was inconsistent with 
many of the Justices' political philosophies. At least as applied in Pat-
terson, stare decisis was far more than a post-hoc rationalization for 
the Court's decision. 
The uncertainty about the current status of stare decisis can be 
attributed, at least in part, to the fuzziness of the stare decisis principle 
itself. Because the current rule allows the Court to overrule prec-
edents where there is some "special justification,"13 a term which the 
Court has never clearly defined, it is often impossible to assess whether 
a decision has or has not been faithful to the stare decisis principle.14 
In any event, the perception that stare decisis is being eroded is a mat-
ter of considerable consequence. Once some members of the Court 
begin to treat precedent lightly, other members of the Court are in-
creasingly likely to refuse to conform to the dictates of precedent.15 
On a larger scale, once one majority overrules some of a previous ma-
jority's decisions, it is difficult to demand that successor majorities re-
spect their predecessors' precedents. 16 
In some respects, these problems are inevitable in a system that 
attempts delicately to balance the stability of the law with the obvious 
need occasionally to overrule some pernicious precedents. Unless we 
11. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) 
(H. Lodge ed. 1888)). 
12. 109 S. Ct. at 2370. Perhaps an argument can be made that the decision "to reaffirm Run-
yon was not really based on stare decisis, but was a response to the remarkable public outcry 
accompanying the Court's announcement that it would reconsider Runyon. But the public out-
cry was itself connected to the special concerns surrounding the overruling of precedent. It 
seems clear, then, that stare decisis played a critical decisional role in the Patterson case. See 
Marshall, In One Case, a Positive Development the Critics Shouldn't Ignore, Chicago Tribune, 
June 21, 1989, at Cl9. 
13. 109 S. Ct. at 2370 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
14. Judge Easterbrook describes the rule as "a grand balancing test, with neither a maxi-
mand nor weights to produce a decision when the criteria conflict, as they always do." Easter-
brook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 422 (1988). 
15. See generally R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 8-9, 206-09 (1984) 
(perception that other party will not cooperate, or is "defecting," will cause rational actor to 
defect in order to avoid complete loss, a "sucker's payoff"). For an exceptionally candid admis-
sion in this regard, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (attributing his willingness to overrule certain eleventh amendment precedents to 
the fact that a majority of the Court had "not felt constrained by stare decisis" in deciding 
another eleventh amendment case one Term earlier). 
16. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 429. James Boyle describes "a kind of angst exper-
ienced by liberals who can find no formal, qualitative distinction between the attitude towards 
constitutional precedent shown by today's Supreme Court and that shown by the Warren 
Court." Boyle, Legal Fiction (Book Review), 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1013, 1019 (1987). 
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are willing to live with decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 11 or are 
willing to rely on constitutional amendment to overrule them, stare 
decisis cannot be cast in absolute terms. Once an absolute rule of stare 
decisis is rejected, however, there is no objective test for gauging ad-
herence to the rule of precedent. The identical constitutional prec-
edent, say Roe v. Wade, 18 can be one Justice's Plessy v. Ferguson and 
another's Brown v. Board of Education. 19 Can the Justice who takes 
the former view be criticized for ignoring the role of precedent if he or 
she votes to overrule Roe?2° 
Based on this realization about the need for change in some areas 
of the law, the Supreme Court has repeatedly demonstrated its willing-
ness to overrule decisions construing the Constitution.21 The most no-
table recent example is the Court's dramatic triple flip-flop in deciding 
whether the tenth amendment imposes any justiciable constraints on 
Congress' commerce power. In its 1976 decision in National League 
of Cities v. Usery, 22 a 5-4 majority overruled a number of precedents 
construing that amendment, including Maryland v. Wirtz, 23 a case 
that had been decided by a 6-2 vote only eight years earlier. The 
Court did not even consider itself compelled to grapple with the issue 
of stare decisis. Later, in 1985, a 5-4 Court in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 24 reversed Usery, dismissing the need 
to adhere to precedent in a terse penultimate paragraph.25 There are 
many other examples of this rather casual treatment of constitutional 
precedent. 26 Taken together they demonstrate that the Court has 
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that "separate but equal" treatment of blacks did not vio· 
late the fourteenth amendment). 
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing woman's fundamental right to abortion). 
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy with respect to public education). 
20. Cf Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3064-67 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (calling on Court to reconsider Roe). 
21. See generally Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 
1980 WIS. L. REV. 467. 
22. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
23. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
24. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
25. The relevant language was: 
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. We have not hesitated, however, when it has 
become apparent that a prior decision has departed from a proper understanding of congres· 
sional power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 
(1941). Due respect for the reach of congressional power within the federal system man· 
dates that we do so now. 
469 U.S. at 557. 
26. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989) (overruling Procunier v. Marti· 
nez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (overruling O'Callahan 
v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (overruling Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling Parral! v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same). 
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tended to adhere to Justice Brandeis' classic proclamation that 
in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible, th[e] court has often overruled 
its earlier decisions. The court bows to the lessons of experience and the 
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, 
so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial 
function. 27 
When the precedent in question involves an issue of statutory in-
terpretation, as opposed to constitutional interpretation, however, the 
Court has traditionally articulated and followed a different approach. 
The flip side of the Court's readiness to overrule constitutional prec-
edents has been its general reticence to overrule precedents construing 
statutes. In no less significant a case than Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 28 the Court indicated that it would have been unwilling to 
overrule Swift v. Tyson 29 "[i]f only a question of statutory construction 
were involved."30 The Court reached its landmark decision changing 
the course of the federal judiciary's role only because it believed, or at 
least claimed, that the Swift rule was unconstitutional. Flood v. 
Kuhn 31 is another notable example of the Court's hesitance to over-
rule statutory precedents. The Court's asserted justification for not 
extending antitrust principles to professional baseball, and therefore 
treating baseball differently from football, basketball, and other profes-
sional leagues, was the existence of two precedents - one from the 
1920s32 and one from 1950s33 - that Congress had never reversed 
through legislation. In recent times, the Court frequently has relied 
on a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis to explain why it de-
clined to overrule a statutory precedent, 34 most recently in the Patter-
27. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (footnotes omitted). 
28. 304 U.S. 64 (1937). 
29. 41 U.S. l (1842). 
30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77. Interestingly, it appears that this language may not have been 
Justice Brandeis' own, but rather was proposed by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone as a condition of 
his joining the opinion. See R. SHNAYERSON, THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1987) (photograph of letter from Justice Stone to Justice 
Brandeis, dated March 25, 1938). Justice Stone's condition is not surprising given his strong 
adherence to a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 
310 U.S. 469 (1940); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
31. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
32. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
33. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
34. See, e.g., Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 n.34 (1986); 
NLRB v. International Longshoremen Assn., 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); see also Teague v. 
Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (distinguishing case as 
not implicating "our practice of according special weight to statutory precedents"). 
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son decision.35 Although there are also a great many cases where the 
Court appears to ignore this doctrine, 36 the rule continues to be in-
voked frequently, and appears to exert substantial weight with some 
members of the Court. 
This article analyzes whether the Court is justified in invoking a 
more forceful rule of stare decisis in statutory cases than in other in-
stances. 37 The article begins by analyzing some of the conventional 
justifications that have been offered for the rule. 38 Part I evaluates the 
retrospective theory of congressional acquiescence, which posits that 
Congress, by not enacting legislation to reverse the Court's construc-
tion of a statute, demonstrates its approval of that earlier precedent. 
35. "Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation 
.•.. " Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989). 
36. Some recent examples include Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Express, Inc., 
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)) and Gulfstream Aero· 
space Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988) (overruling Enelow v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935) and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942)). 
For a list of cases between 1961 and 1987 in which the Supreme Court explicitly overruled 
statutory precedents, see Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 16 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1427-29 
(1988). 
37. If the only available comparison were between constitutional and statutory precedents, it 
would be necessary to consider whether the difference between the two is attributable to the 
rather fluid way in which American courts have interpreted the Constitution, compared to their 
more rigid approach to statutory interpretation. One reason, no doubt, that the Supreme Court 
has not "adhered rigidly to stare decisis" in constitutional cases is because "constitutional law is 
thought to be a living instrument of public policy adaptable to changing circumstances." 
Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 
CoNST. COMMENTARY 123, 127 (1985); see also w.o. DOUGLAS, STARE DECISIS 9 (1949) ("So 
far as constitutional law is concerned stare decisis must give way before the dynamic component 
of history."). Although this special attribute of constitutional law surely explains some of the 
difference between the treatment of constitutional and statutory precedents, it does not explain it 
all. For it seems clear that the respect the Supreme Court accords its statutory precedents is 
unusually strong compared to stare decisis as generally employed by federal and state courts -
not just constitutional stare decisis. 
For example, the Court appears to place federal common law precedents somewhere in be-
tween the two extremes of constitutional and statutory precedents. In Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Court overruled an 84-year-old precedent limiting recovery for 
wrongful death under federal admiralty law. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
Although the Court dealt with the stare decisis principle at length, see Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403-
05, it explicitly rejected an argument, often made in the context of cases interpreting statutes, 
that any change in the law should come exclusively from Congress, see 398 U.S. at 405 n.17. 
Moragne and a few other federal common law cases have led William Eskridge to conclude that 
the Court accords common law precedents a stronger presumption of correctness than constitu-
tional precedents, but is not as unwilling to reconsider precedents involving common law as it is 
precedents interpreting acts of Congress. See Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1368. 
38. The article does not question or endorse any of the traditional goals of stare decisis, 
which include promoting certainty, respecting reliance on earlier decisions, honoring settled ex-
pectations, promoting efficient adjudication, affording uniform treatment to all litigants, and pre· 
serving the integrity of the courts in the public's view. See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); L. GOLDSTEIN, PRECEDENT IN LAW (1987); E. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCT!ON TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: 
TOWARD A THEORY bF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961 ); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORD· 
HAM L. REV. I (1948). 
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Part I argues that this rationale is unable to support a heightened rule 
of statutory stare decisis because it fails to reflect the realities of the 
legislative process and is inconsistent with the established goals of stat-
utory interpretation. Part II considers two resource allocation princi-
ples that have been advanced in defense of a heightened rule of 
statutory stare decisis. These principles posit that the Court need not 
expend its resources on revisiting statutory precedents either because 
Congress is available to serve that role, or, alternatively, because Con-
gress is indifferent to the accuracy of judicial interpretations of stat-
utes. Although these theories attempt to allocate resources efficiently 
between Congress and the Court, this Part argues that they do not 
succeed, and that a heightened or absolute rule of statutory stare deci-
sis can be supported only by some normative theory that puts the job 
of revisiting judicial construction of statutes on Congress' shoulders. 
Part III develops such a normative theory based on a vision of 
constitutional separation of powers. Examining the role that the 
courts have fashioned for themselves in statutory interpretation, this 
article suggests that the dominant role courts play in the development 
of statutory law poses significant countermajoritarian difficulties. In 
light of these difficulties, this article asserts that it is critical to 
reinvolve Congress as an active participant in this ongoing process of 
statutory lawmaking. One way to do this is to let Congress know that 
it, and only it, is responsible for reviewing the Court's statutory deci-
sions, and that it, and only it, has the power to overrule the Court's 
interpretations of federal statutes. Beyond defending the traditional 
heightened rule of statutory stare decisis, this article concludes that 
the Supreme Court should adopt an absolute rule of stare decisis for 
all of its statutory and federal common law decisions. 39 Finally, Parts 
39. Discussing the contours of the stare decisis principle may not seem particularly meaning-
ful to those who believe that courts are not actually constrained by rules of decision such as stare 
decisis or canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 
148-59 (1930). This type of cynicism (or realism) is not hard to come by. Reading through a 
volume of the United States Reports is bound to convince a reader that the Court is either being 
routinely unfaithful to precedent, or that precedents are so vague and directionless that they offer 
little meaningful guidance in deciding the kinds of cases with which the Supreme Court typically 
deals. It seems quite clear that both of these phenomena occur quite regularly. But that does not 
mean that it is useless to think and talk about precedent, for there are a great many cases where 
courts are willing to be bound by their readings of earlier decisions, and where those decisions 
provide a relatively clear and undisputable rule of decision. See Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 
66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 367 (1988) ("even a cursory reading of the reports reveals that reliance on 
precedent is one of the distinctive features of the American judicial system"). For example, it 
seems impossible to argue that the Court in Patterson could have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did 
not apply to any private acts of discrimination unless the Court was willing to overrule Runyon. 
See infra note 44. 
Of course, because of the nature of cases that the Supreme Court decides to review, the 
presence of a clear, on-point precedent is apt to be rarer in Supreme Court cases than in cases 
decided by lower federal courts. Cf. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
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IV and V consider and reject a variety of potential challenges to the 
separation-of-powers model and proposal this article sets forth. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE 
The conventional explanation for the heightened role of stare deci-
sis in statutory cases is that congressional failure to enact legislation 
reversing a judicial decision indicates Congress' approval of the 
Court's interpretation of an earlier statute. As the Court recently ex-
pressed it, "When a court says to a legislature: 'You (or your prede-
cessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to answer: 'We did 
not.' "40 This argument has often appeared in Supreme Court deci-
sions and dissents, although for just about "every case where the 
Court rhapsodizes about deliberative inaction, there is a counter-case 
subjecting such inferences to scathing critique."41 Without attempting 
to reconcile all of the Court's treatments of this issue, 42 it is worth 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (describing the skewed conclusions that may result from focusing on 
certain types of cases); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 409-10 (1985) (discussing 
fallacy of relying on Supreme Court decisions in assessing nature of legal problems). 
40. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 
(1987) (quoting G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-32 (1982)). 
41. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 91 (1988). Cases cited 
from the past few Terms are not unique in their dramatically divergent views about the relevance 
of congressional inaction; the inconsistencies date back much further. Compare Apex Hosiery 
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after 
it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly 
recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the 
judicial construction is the correct one.") with Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) 
("It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this 
Court from reexamining its own doctrines.") and Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 
(1946) ("It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a control-
ling rule of law."). These cases surely confirm Justice Jackson's classic understatement that in 
ascribing meaning to statutes, courts lack "really effective guidance from consistently accepted 
principles of interpretation." Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What 
the Court Says, A.B.A. J., July 1948, at 535, 537. 
42. The Court has been a bit more consistent in dealing with cases where Congress has reen-
acted a statute but has not changed the language in order to modify an earlier decision constru· 
ing the statute. Reenactments are often treated as ratifications of the courts' earlier construction 
of the statute. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); Don E. Williams Co. v. 
Commissioner oflntemal Revenue, 429 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1977); United States v. Hermanos Y 
Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908). Even in this area, however, there have been instances 
where the Court has refused to be bound by the notion of ratification and has attacked it as a rule 
of construction. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 24-25 (1969); United States v. 
Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957); Commissioner oflntemal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
This article does not independently address the reenactment issue because the issue does not 
involve stare decisis - rather, it is a pure matter of interpreting a statute by reference to congres-
sional intent. Once Congress reenacts a statute it is the reenacted statute that courts must inter-
pret, and the intent or purpose of the reenacting Congress is the relevant intent or purpose (if the 
intent or purpose of any Congress is relevant). Prior decisions interpreting an earlier version of 
the statute are not binding as a matter of stare decisis, for they interpreted a different statute. 
The relevance of the earlier decisions, therefore, is limited to informing the court about how the 
reenacting Congress may have understood the words it used. See Cannon v. University of Chi-
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noting that some of the Court's apparently conflicting rulings on the 
subject of acquiescence can be harmonized by taking into account the 
Court's assessment of the probability that members of Congress were 
actually aware of the decision in question. 43 The great majority of 
cases invoking a strong rule of statutory stare decisis have either 
pointed to actual evidence that members of Congress were aware of 
the earlier decision, 44 or have presumed that the matter decided was so 
newsworthy that it is inconceivable that Congress was unaware of it.45 
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976). 
That reenactment is not truly a rule of stare decisis can be seen by the Court's use of the reenact-
ment rule in cases where Congress has reenacted statutory language after it has been construed 
by lower federal courts or by an administrative agency. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (reenactment after interpretation by lower courts). 
Stare decisis would certainly not compel the Court to adhere to such decisions, but a rule that 
viewed reenactment as a tool of construing legislative intent might. Of course, even in the ab-
sence of reenactment the Court may find significance in Congress' non-response to lower court 
rulings and administrative interpretations. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 
600 (1983) (relying on Congress' failure to overrule Internal Revenue Service rulings); McNally 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for adherence to 
lower court rulings given Congress' lack of response to prior interpretations of federal mail fraud 
statutes). But this, too, is not a concept of stare decisis and is therefore beyond the scope of this 
article. 
The reenactment rule is itself quite controversial and is subject to some, but not all, of the 
criticisms that have been directed at the silent-acquiescence argument. For critical treatments of 
the rule, see Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 377 
(1941); Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1311 (1941); Grabow, 
Congressional Silence and the Search into Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unreali-
ties'~ 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 754-64 (1984); Griswold, A Summary of The Regulations Problem, 
54 HARV. L. REV. 398 (1941); Note, The Effect of Prior Judicial and Administrative Construc-
tions on Codification of Pre-Existing Federal Statutes: The Case of the Federal Securities Code, 15 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1978). 
43. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 75-76. 
44. In United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987), the Court reaffirmed the much-vilified 
Feres doctrine, attributing significance to the fact that Congress had "recently considered, but 
not enacted, legislation" that would have at least partially overruled Feres v. United States, 340 
U.S. 135 (1950). Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686 n.6. 
The Court generally attributes even more significance to cases where one or both bodies of 
Congress has actually defeated legislation proposed in response to the Court's earlier construc-
tion of the statute. Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), is a good example. There, the 
Court declined to revisit the question of whether 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 extended to private 
actors, which had been decided in four earlier cases, most notably in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court considered it "noteworthy" that after the Jones decision 
Congress had enacted a statute on a somewhat related matter, and that Congress had "specifi-
cally considered and rejected an amendment that would have repealed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, as interpreted by this Court in Jones, insofar as it affords private-sector employees a right 
of action based on racial discrimination in employment." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 174. "There 
could hardly be a clearer indication of congressional agreement with the view that§ 1981 does 
reach private acts of racial discrimination." 427 U.S. at 174-75; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258 (1972); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1940). 
45. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 (1987), for 
example, the Court attributed substantial significance to Congress' failure to overrule United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), which interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 as not forbidding all race-based affirmative action in employment. The Court acknowl-
edged that there had never been any proposal to overrule Weber in Congress, a factor that ordi-
narily might lead the Court to question whether members of Congress were even aware of the 
decision. But, because the Court believed that Weber "was a widely publicized decision that 
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The notion of silent acquiescence has long been condemned as 
based on unrealistic and irrelevant assumptions about the legislative 
process.46 This article addresses four major grounds for this condem-
nation: ignorance, inertia, interpretational ambiguity, and irrelevance. 
Before dissecting each of these specific points, though, it is worthwhile 
to clarify how a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis operates. In 
the rule's purest form, a court invoking stare decisis refuses to reverse 
a statutory precedent even though the court is quite convinced that the 
earlier decision was wrongly decided. Under the conventional ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, where the courts seek to discern the 
intent of the legislature that enacted the statute, 47 this means that the 
court will ignore its current understanding of the enacting Congress' 
intent in favor of adhering to what it now considers to have been an 
erroneously decided precedent. Of course, the principle of statutory 
stare decisis often plays a more limited role than this; but in analyzing 
the propriety of the doctrine it is useful to examine it in its starkest 
form. 
A. Ignorance 
One obvious problem with interpreting Congress' inaction as evi-
dence of congressional acquiescence is that members of Congress are 
often unaware of Supreme Court decisions, particularly on relatively 
obscure issues. Judge Abner Mikva, who served in the House of Rep-
resentatives for five terms prior to his appointment to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has ob-
served that, "[w]hile it is true ... that a majority of the members of 
Congress are lawyers, they have not kept up-to-date on recent legal 
developments. In fact, most Supreme Court decisions never come to 
the attention of Congress."48 This may not have been a major prob-
addressed a prominent issue of public debate," Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7, the Court assumed 
that members of Congress did know about the decision, and that the lack of any attempt to 
overrule it was based on acquiescence - not ignorance. 
46. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 179-83 
(1975); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application 
of Law 1393-1401 (tentative ed. 1958) (unpublished manuscript) (questioning doctrine); Es-
kridge, supra note 36, at 1402-09; Grabow, supra note 42, at 741-54; Tribe, Toward a Syntax of 
the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J, 515 
(1982). 
47. This and other approaches to statutory interpretation are discussed infra at notes 77-106 
and accompanying text. 
48. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 
587, 609 (1983); see also Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 384 
("most of the time Congress does not read judicial opinions and does not know whether courts 
properly interpreted the statute"); W. KEEFE & M. 0GUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PRO-
CESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 420 (5th ed. 1981) ("legislative bodies rarely concern them-
selves with activities of the courts"); s. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICAL 
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lem many years ago, when the Court began to talk about, silent acqui-
escence. "Life was simpler then."49 The number of statutes being 
interpreted was small as compared with the post-New Deal age.so To-
day, however, it seems quite unrealistic to assume that a substantial 
number of congressional actors are routinely made aware of most 
court decisions on statutory matters. This being the case, how can a 
court possibly find acquiescence in Congress' silence? 
One might respond by arguing that it is wrong to focus on whether 
all or most members of Congress are aware of a given decision. 
Rather, the focus ought to be on the members of specific committees 
and subcommittees who have the practical power to decide whether 
proposed legislation in their subject areas will be passed, and who tend 
to be quite involved in monitoring the areas over which their commit-
tees have jurisdiction.s1 These committees and subcommittees have 
staffs with the capacity, and often the responsibility, to monitor legal 
developments in their areas of specialization. s2 Moreover, it is silly to 
think that any members of Congress or their staffs have to read United 
States Law Week in order to be apprised of Supreme Court decisions. 
Untold numbers oflobbyists make their livings by informing members 
of Congress and their staffs of new developments and convincing them 
to support or oppose change.s3 In short, the argument goes, although 
it is unrealistic to imagine that all members of Congress spend signifi-
cant time monitoring and reflecting upon court decisions interpreting 
statutes, it is also unrealistic to think that relevant members of Con-
gress, and hence Congress, as an institution, are oblivious to court 
decisions. 
It is, of course, hard to contest the fact that Congress is, in some 
important respects, run by committees, and that. these committees 
PROCESS 144 (1965) ("No study has been undertaken to estimate the number of Court decisions 
heavily criticized in Congress, but these would surely constitute a small fraction of the total 
number. Most never come to the attention of Congress at all."). 
49. Griswold, supra note 42, at 401-02 n.16. 
50. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 1; G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 68-98 (1977); Note, supra note 42, at 386. 
51. See generally R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMfITEES (1973); G. GOODWIN, THE 
LITILE LEGISLATURES (1970). It is not clear, however, to what extent committee members 
actually do monitor judicial developments. Judge Mikva has written that "[m]embers of Con-
gress do not even closely follow cases directly involving or interpreting statutes that they have 
sponsored or in which they have an interest." Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. 
L. REV. 627, 630 (1987). 
52. See generally H. Fox & s. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE 
FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING (1977); K. KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CON-
GRESS (1977); T. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 61-89 (1980). 
53. See generally R. FENNO, supra note 51, at 22-41; D. HALL, COOPERATIVE LoBBYING: 
THE POWER OF PRESSURE (1969); M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS (1981). 
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have the capacity to monitor judicial decisions. But does it follow that 
courts should attribute significance to these committees' inaction? 
Does it make sense for a court to ignore what it thinks was the intent 
of the entire Congress that enacted a statute in 1870, just because vari-
ous powerful members of today's Congress have not taken measures to 
reverse a 1976 court decision interpreting the 1870 enactment?54 
In a sense, these questions go to the heart of the legislative process, 
where immense power is exerted by a very few members of Congress. 
But it is unnecessary to challenge this general system in order to de-
nounce reliance on congressional acquiescence. Leaving aside the 
political pressure they can exert on their colleagues, the power of con-
gressional leaders is largely a negative power; they often can control 
the agenda in a manner that effectively kills certain proposed legisla-
tion. ss They do not alone possess the affirmative power to pass legis-
lation, which continues to require the votes of at least a majority of a 
quorum of each body of Congress. 56 There is a world of difference 
between affirmative and negative powers in this respect. A great many 
provisions of the Constitution (including bicameralism, the executive 
veto, and judicial review) present impediments to the passage of legis-
lation, reflecting the essentially conservative bias of our system of gov-
ernment. s7 The negative power that congressional leaders wield is just 
another countermajoritarian obstacle that must be avoided en route to 
enacting legislation. 
This distinction between negative and affirmative powers is critical 
to the question of congressional acquiescence. A court that relies on 
acquiescence does far more than give a veto power to a minority of the 
legislature. The court, in essence, treats Congress' silence as the func-
tional equivalent of an affirmative congressional enactment endorsing 
the court's earlier (now recognized as erroneous) decision. Aside from 
S4. The years used here relate to the issue before the Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). 
SS. See R. FENNO, supra note 51, at 172; M. FIORINA, CONGRESS - KEYSTONE OF THE 
w ASHINGTON EsTABLISHMENT 62-67 (1977); M. HAYES, supra note 53, at 36; A. MIKVA & P. 
SARIS, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH 120 (1983). The power of the current 
leadership is, however, nowhere near as strong as it once was. See generally L. DODD & R. 
SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 106-29 (1979); Fitts, The Vices of Vir-
tue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1567, 1628-33 (1988). 
56. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 508 (1987). 
57. "[M]ost of the antimajoritarian elements that have been found in the American legisla-
tive process - both quantitatively and qualitatively - are negative ones, i.e., they work to pre-
vent the translation of popular wishes into governing rules rather than to produce laws that are 
contrary to majority sentiment." J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLIT-
ICAL PROCESS 26 (1980). 
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creating significant constitutional quandaries, 58 attributing significance 
to congressional silence surely fails to reflect the reality that a majority 
of Congress frequently was never even made aware of the Court deci-
sion in question. 
The Court's response to the possibility that Congress' silence was a 
result of ignorance rather than considered acquiescence has been to 
attribute more significance to inaction when there is some evidence, or 
at least strong reason to believe, that a large number of members of 
Congress were made aware of the decision. 59 This methodology has 
serious flaws, however. To begin with, it assumes that just because a 
speech is made or a bill is proposed, a great many members of Con-
gress are aware of the issue. There is no evidence that this is true, and 
strong reason to believe it is not. 60 In the absence of an actual vote by 
an entire body, it seems unrealistic to assume that members of Con-
gress are made more knowledgeable about a decision simply because 
some committee holds a hearing or some members make speeches 
about it.61 
Moreover, the Court's incremental approach can lead to perverse 
results. If there has been complete congressional silence on an issue, 
the Court is likely to attribute only minimal significance to Congress' 
inaction, at least as long as it is not convinced that members of Con-
gress must have known about the decision. 62 It is possible, however, 
that Congress' complete silence might actually indicate unanimous 
agreement with the decision - a factor that would be expected to 
command substantial respect from a Court looking for evidence of ac-
quiescence. On the other hand, if a large group of senators sponsor an 
58. See infra notes 77-100 and accompanying text. 
59. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
60. See D. VOGLER & s. WALDMAN, CONGRESS AND DEMOCRACY 112 (1985) (discussing 
sources of information that legislators tend to rely on); Mikva, supra note 51, at 631-32 (decrying 
judicial reliance on created legislative history); Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative 
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200-03 (1983) (surveying pro-
bative value of different types of legislative history). See generally W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
709-52 (1988) (discussing uses and misuses of legislative history). 
61. Of course, even when votes are taken and Congress passes a measure, it is far-fetched to 
assume that all voting members have read the committee reports and sponsors' statements - the 
type of legislative history on which the courts routinely rely in statutory interpretation. See 
Hirschey v. Federal Energy Reg. Commn., 777 F.2d l, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); see also supra note 60. But when a member of Congress has voted on a bill, she has 
presumably had access to the legislative history, and an opportunity to contradict any implica-
tions with which she disagrees. Moreover, there is an important distinction between using com-
mittee reports and the like as evidentiary factors in statutory interpretation, and using such 
materials to support a superpresumption of stare decisis that would bar the court from changing 
the construction of a statute even when all other pieces of evidence point to the conclusion that 
the result reached by an earlier court was wrong. 
62. See supra note 45. 
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amendment to overrule a decision, and that amendment is never 
passed, the Court is likely to attribute great significance to Congress' 
inaction. Unanimous agreement with a decision may thus command 
less respect from the Court than a sharply divided Congress' failure to 
overrule a precedent. This paradox can create a strong disincentive 
for legislators to do what legislators should do when they want to ex-
press their intent - attempt to pass laws. 
B. Inertia 
The possibility of ignorance is not the only, or necessarily the most 
severe, problem of interpreting congressional inaction. Varied expla-
nations of legislative inaction apply even to a Congress full of legisla-
tors who are acutely aware of, and strongly disagree with, a court 
decision construing an act of Congress. For example, as Hart and 
Sacks suggest, a legislator who believes that a decision should be over-
ruled might decline to support legislation overruling the decision be-
cause of a "[b]elief that other measures have a stronger claim on the 
limited time and energy of the [legislative] body."63 Public choice the-
ory forcefully drives this point home. There is an active market for 
the commodity of legislation, and congressional inaction on a given 
issue often means merely that some group outbid those who wanted 
Congress to expend energy overruling a particular judicial decision. 64 
Moreover, it has long been recognized that proposed legislative action 
frequently can be killed by a powerful minority of one legislative body, 
a party leader, or a chairman of a key committee. 65 
Many other factors related to the intricacies of the legislative pro-
cess are also potentially relevant in trying to understand why Congress 
might decline to overrule a decision with which most members disa-
gree. A few more selections from Hart and Sack's classic list should 
suffice here: "[b ]elief that the bill is sound in principle but politically 
inexpedient to be connected with"; "[u]nwillingness to have the bill's 
sponsors get credits for its enactment"; "[b]elief that the bill is sound 
in principle but defective in material particulars"; or "[t]entative ap-
proval, but belief that action should be withheld until the problem can 
be attacked on a broader front". 66 Perhaps the most important item 
63. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 46, at 1395; see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 
14, 23 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) ("the sheer pressure of other and more important busi-
ness" may prevent Congress from correcting misconstructions of statutes). 
64. For accessible introductions to this material, see Symposium on the Theory of Public 
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). The classic work in the area is J. BUCHANAN & G. TUL· 
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). 
65. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
66. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 46, at 1395 -96. For similar lists of possible reasons for 
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on Hart and Sacks' list is their thirteenth entry: "Etc., etc., etc., etc., 
etc.",67 which hints at the innumerable facets of inertia that the legis-
lature must overcome to enact a law. 
As a general matter, courts must live with these realities of the 
legislative process. The Constitution surely would not allow federal 
judges routinely to institute regulatory measures and public interest 
provisions, even though judges might confidently conclude that only 
time pressure or interest group politics has prevented the legislature 
from enacting such measures. When it comes to enacting legislation, 
the courts have no choice but to wait for Congress to act. As dis-
cussed previously, this state of affairs is consistent with the general 
conservative bias implicit in the Constitution's peculiar system of sepa-
rated powers. 68 But this bias does not justify ignoring the effect of 
inertia when attempting to understand the meaning of Congress' si-
lence. Allowing inertia to exert a veto power over proposed legislation 
is far different from giving inertia-induced silence the power of trump-
ing earlier congressional enactments as the court now understands 
them. 
In sum, besides the possibility of "unawareness," "[c]ongressional 
inaction frequently betokens ... preoccupation[ ] or paralysis."69 
That a bill was never introduced, died in committee, or was defeated 
in a vote therefore fails to identify the intent of Congress. The point 
here is not that inaction is wholly non-probative of legislative intent; 
as a matter of logic it is relevant. 70 But this logical relevance does not 
demonstrate that the probability of congressional agreement is suffi-
cient to support any form of a presumption of congressional 
acquiescence. 
C. Interpretational Ambiguity 
The collective action problems described above clearly can keep a 
measure from being enacted into law even if a majority theoretically 
congressional inaction, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 
U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); M. HAYES, supra note 53, at 35; Eskridge, supra note 
36, at 1405. 
67. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 46, at 1396. 
68. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
69. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969). 
70. Because Congress will virtually never vote to overturn an interpretation it agrees with, 
its failure to overturn the statute increases the likelihood that Congress in fact agreed. In-
deed, so long as silence is a more likely response when Congress affirmatively approves of 
the Court's interpretation than otherwise, probability theory indicates that, no matter how 
many other causes of congressional silence may exist, silence is still a signal of congressional 
approval. 
Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 
(1988) (footnote omitted). 
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would prefer the change the bill would effectuate over the interpreta-
tion the Court has adopted. But even if one ignores concerns of igno-
rance and inertia, or dismisses them as part of the political process, it 
remains difficult to construe Congress' inaction as acquiescence. For 
how is the Court to define what Congress intended to acquiesce to? 
Did Congress agree with the Court's decision? Or did it simply agree 
that the Courts should be accorded considerable flexibility in inter-
preting the statute? 
In Snyder v. Harris, 71 for example, the Court held that separate 
claims presented by different plaintiffs in a class action may not be 
added together to satisfy the jurisdictional amount for diversity juris-
diction. The statute governing diversity jurisdiction provided that the 
"matter in controversy" must exceed the sum or value of $10,000, 72 
and the Court purported to rely on early precedents interpreting that 
phrase as requiring that this amount be in controversy between a sin-
gle plaintiff and a single defendant. 73 Refusing to reconsider the "judi-
cial interpretation of congressional language that has stood for more 
than a century and a half,"74 the Court emphasized that Congress had 
repeatedly amended the diversity statute, specifically the amount in 
controversy provision, but had never changed the Court's construction 
· on this narrow issue. 75 
Snyder's analysis, however, fails to explain why Congress' inaction 
should· be interpreted as acquiescence in the specific result that the 
Court reached, as opposed to acquiescence to the Court exercising 
wide flexibility in relatively mundane procedural matters.76 Much as 
71. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). The jurisdictional amount has since been elevated to $50,000. 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title II,§ 201, 102 Stat. 
4646 (1988). 
73. See, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & 
Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911). 
74. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338. Among the many oddities in the area of stare decisis are the 
divergent effects attributed to the passage of time. Many opinions stress the recency of the prece-
dent when explaining why it must be obeyed; other opinions emphasize the age of the decision in 
demanding that it be afforded respect. Compare Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186 (1976) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (stare decisis is more forceful when matter was "recently" decided) with 
Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338 (emphasizing long pedigree of rule) and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & 
Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Stare decisis less forceful where "[t]he 
decisions are recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in."). 
75. Given the many reenactments of the statute, Snyder does not actually fit the pure inac-
tion model. See supra note 42. Nonetheless, what it demonstrates about the problem of ambigu-
ity applies forcefully to both inaction and reenactment cases. 
76. This argument is different from Hart and Sack's suggestion that votes may be withheld 
out of "[c]omplete disinterest." H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 46, at 1395. The point here is 
that Congress may deliberately desire to afford the courts flexibility. See Eskridge, supra note 
36, at 1424-25; Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Com-
ment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1552 n.12 (1963). 
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Congress has delegated the job of formulating rules of procedures to 
the courts, it might plausibly be unwilling to interfere with judicial 
constructions of specific jurisdictional statutes. The mere fact of con-
gressional inaction does not give the court any guidance as to which of 
these significantly divergent messages Congress has sent. 
D. Irrelevance 
Ultimately, the most significant problem facing the silent acquies-
cence argument is its inconsistency with the Court's own theory of 
statutory interpretation, that "[i]t is the intent of the Congress that 
enacted" the statute in question "that controls."77 Although there is 
some academic support for a more "dynamic" approach to statutory 
interpretation, 78 the Court has adhered to a basically originalist model 
of statutory construction - attempting to understand what the legis-
lature that enacted the statute intended to accomplish by the words it 
chose.79 
No one has ever explained how a court attempting to understand 
the intent of a Congress that passed a statute in 1866 or 1870 can find 
any guidance in the views of a Congress sitting in the 1970s. 80 Indeed, 
the irony of the matter is that the Court appears willing to find signifi-
cance in Congress' silence, while generally declining to rely on far 
more explicit post-enactment legislative history - even of the Con-
gress that passed the statute being interpreted! According to the 
Court, "post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot 
serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the 
Act's passage."81 It is downright silly for a court that takes this stand 
77. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2191 (1988) (quoting Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977)). 
78. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. 
79. There is, of course, considerable debate about the level of abstraction judges should use in 
interpreting legislative intent or purpose. Compare, e.g, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 
1811, 1830 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) with 108 S. Ct. at 
1834-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); compare also R. POSNER, supra 
note 5, at 267-72 with Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). But all of 
these approaches work within the framework of a search for the intent or purpose of the enacting 
Congress. 
80. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 & n.11 (1976). See generally Easterbrook, 
supra note 14, at 427; Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 40-41 
(1988). 
81. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974); see also TVA v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 192-93 (1978); Easterbrook, supra note 79, at 538 ("Despite the information it 
conveys about the meaning of Congress, [post-enactment legislative history] neither adds to nor 
detracts from the meaning of the legislation actually enacted."). For a striking example of the 
Court's refusal to look at post-enactment history, see Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 
(1984), where the Court attributed no significance to a House Resolution passed by a 414-8 vote 
shortly before the case was argued in the Court. 465 U.S. at 598 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Congress did, eventually, get its way when it overruled the Court's 
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with respect to rather contemporaneous and explicit post-enactment 
history to afford extraordinary significance to far removed and ambig-
uous inaction. 
Indeed, it is more than silly; it is contrary to fundamental constitu-
tional principles. 82 A law can be enacted only by being passed in both 
houses of the Congress and being presented to the President for possi-
ble veto. 83 Each of these three institutions - the House, the Senate, 
and the President - therefore has the constitutional authority to pre-
vent the other two from enacting their will into law. 84 Attributing 
significance to congressional silence subverts this scheme considerably, 
as a simple example will reveal. Suppose that the House and Senate 
had both responded to the Court's rehearing order in Patterson v. Mc-
Clean Credit Union 85 by passing legislation explicitly ratifying Runyon 
v. McCrary. 86 Suppose further that the President vetoed the bill, and 
that the bill's supporters were unable to gather the necessary votes for 
a veto override. Could the Court attribute interpretational signifi-
cance to this frustrated congressional action? Only at the expense of 
freezing the President out of his constitutionally authorized role. Re-
cent decisions such as Chadha v. INS87 and Bowsher v. Synar, 88 which 
affirm the importance of following the constitutionally prescribed pro-
cedures for enacting legislation, make it highly unlikely that the Court 
would seriously entertain such an idea. Yet affording significance to 
congressional inaction can have this very effect. Inaction enables Con-
gress to effectuate its will without ever risking presidential veto (not to 
mention public scrutiny or pressure). A court concerned with the in-
decision in Grove City by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
As with most rules of statutory construction, a great many cases can be found for the oppo-
site proposition - that some degree of significance should be accorded post-enactment history. 
See, e.g., Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1981); New York Dept. of 
5ocial Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 416 n.19 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969). Indeed, Robert Weisberg observes that "the Court has been utterly 
inconsistent in this area," and that its use of post-enactment history in some cases can be under-
stood as encouraging an "underground railroad across the separation of powers line." Weisberg, 
The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 246· 
48 (1983). 
82. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 n.4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
84. Because of the potential for congressional override of a presidential veto, the executive's 
power is a bit more limited in this respect than that of the two bodies of Congress. 
85. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (ordering parties to brief whether Court should overrule its hold-
ing in Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits certain private 
acts of racial discrimination). 
86. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
87. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
88. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
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tent of the Congress that drafted a statute should not pay attention to 
the action, much less the inaction, of a later Congress, unless that 
Congress succeeds in enacting a new law.89 
For those who take a less originalist approach to statutory inter-
pretation, the relevance of a later Congress' intent or understanding of 
a statute presents a more interesting issue. These dynamic theories 
reject the "assumption of a canonical moment at which a statute is 
born and has all and only the meaning it will ever have."90 Under 
these theories, a later Congress' intent cannot be summarily dismissed 
as irrelevant, as it should be under conventional canons of statutory 
interpretation. But even without regard to the interpretational diffi-
culties already mentioned (ignorance, ambiguity, and inertia), analysis 
of these dynamic or evolutive approaches to statutory interpretation 
indicates that their proponents should be unwilling to have congres-
sional inaction serve as a surrogate for the type of inquiry into current 
norms and legal conventions that they believe the courts should 
undertake. 
Dean Guido Calabresi, for example, who urges that courts repeal_ 
statutes that are obsolete,91 justifies this authority by claiming that the 
courts have a unique institutional ability "to treat like cases alike, to 
adapt to changed technologies and ideologies, and to reflect the evolv-
ing values of a people."92 Calabresi certainly must be unwilling to 
allow the intent of a recent Congress, a body that lacks such capacities 
and whose institutional character gives rise to the problem of obsolete 
statutes in the first place, to bind judges as they carry out this judicial 
function. So, too, Ronald Dworkin, whose Hercules figure disowns a 
purely historical approach to understanding statutes, would appear 
unwilling to embrace a strong rule of statutory stare decisis based on 
legislative inaction. Although Dworkin considers post-enactment his-
tory relevant,93 his theory does not tolerate affording that single factor 
the extraordinary power that a superstrong presumption of stare deci-
sis based on legislative acquiescence would give it.94 
89. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 n.1 (1989) ("Congressional 
inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute."). 
90. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 348 (1986). 
91. Calabresi defines "obsolete" statutes as ones that are no longer consistent with "a new 
social or legal topography." G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 6. 
92. Id. at 98. See generally id. at 96-100. 
93. In interpreting a statute, Hercules "asks which interpretation provides the best account 
of a political history that now includes not only the act but the failure to repeal or amend it later, 
and he will therefore look not to public opinion at the beginning ... but now." R. DWORKIN, 
supra note 90, at 349. 
94. T. Alexander Aleinikoff's treatment of a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis ex-
plains the problem with a presumption of acquiescence. Aleinikoff, who advocates a "nautical" 
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Similarly, William Eskridge, who advocates what he calls "dy-
namic statutory interpretation,"95 should also be expected to find no 
extraordinary significance in the intention of a later Congress. The 
unconventional aspect of Eskridge's model is that, at least in cases 
where the statutory language is unclear,96 he is willing to subordinate 
the enacting legislature's intention or purpose to the interpreting 
judge's view of "current policies and societal conditions."97 But even 
if current congressional silence were a perfect indicator of current con-
gressional intent it appears unlikely that Eskridge would be willing to 
have courts use that intent as a proxy for meaningful analysis of "the 
ways in which the societal and legal environment of the statute have 
materially changed over time."98 The judiciary's unique contributions 
to statutory development, in Eskridge's view, are its distance from the 
political marketplace that tends to slant legislators' views,99 and the 
slow and deliberative method through which judges develop statutory 
law.100 Neither of these features would be used to advantage were 
courts to give nigh dispositive deference to a subsequent Congress' in-
tention, evinced through its silence or otherwise. 
It thus appears that no one along the interpretive spectrum from 
strict originalists to dynamic interpreters should support the notion 
that Congress' inaction is a terribly significant factor in the interpre-
tive process. If the superstrong presumption of statutory stare decisis 
is justified, therefore, it must be for some reason other than any 
messages that can realistically be gleaned from Congress' inaction. 
II. ALLOCATION OF REsOURCES 
The acquiescence argument just described is a retrospective one; it 
attributes legal significance to Congress' failure to react to a judicial 
decision. The acquiescence principle is not to be confused with theo-
ries that fall under the "resource allocation" rubric. Two such theo-
ries advanced in support of a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis 
approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes the courts' role in updating statutes, ex-
plains that his "approach would not accord statutory precedents the current 'superstrong pre· 
sumption.' The value that a nautical approach places on current coherence in the law would 
inform its stance towards precedent." Aleinikoff, supra note 80, at 52 (footnote omitted). 
95. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
96. Eskridge repeatedly asserts that an interpreting court is bound by the clear language of a 
statute. Id. at 1483, 1484, 1496. But this limitation cannot be a terribly significant one for 
Eskridge, who appears to agree with the "body of modern aesthetic theory [that] rejects the 
concept that a text has a single 'true' meaning." Id. at 1509. 
97. Id. at 1484. 
98. Id. at 1483. 
99. Id. at 1534. 
100. Id. at 1537. 
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need to be considered here. First, it has often been asserted that the 
Court need not bother with revisiting statutory precedents because 
Congress is available to overrule statutory decisions. Second, a lead-
ing scholar has recently suggested that Congress is relatively indiffer-
ent to whether courts interpret statutes accurately, and that it is 
therefore unnecessary for courts to spend time trying to correct misin-
terpretations. I will address these arguments in turn. 
A. Congress' Prospective Ability To Overrule Statutory Precedents 
One resource-allocation argument justifies the Court's abstention 
from revisiting statutory decisions by pointing out that no great harm 
is bound to arise from the Court's abstention because Congress is au-
thorized to overrule statutory precedents with which it is unhappy. In 
contrast, a relatively weak form of constitutional stare decisis is appro-
priate, the argument goes, since the Court is the only body practically 
able to remedy its own mistakes in interpreting the Constitution. 101 
The argument is a pragmatic one, allocating the Court's resources (for 
revisiting precedent) according to the perceived need for the Court's 
involvement. I shall call this the "task-splitting" argument. 
The task-splitting theory avoids some, but not all, of the difficulties 
that pervade the acquiescence argument. Interpretational ambigu-
ity102 is no objection, of course, for no congressional action or inaction 
is being interpreted .. Nor would the attack of irrelevance, 103 which 
seemed so powerful with respect to acquiescence, appear to stick here, 
for the task-splitting theory does not attempt to attribute legal signifi-
cance to anything Congress has done. The task-splitting theory does, 
however, have to struggle with the realities of ignorance and inertia. 
As described earlier, 104 these two attributes of the legislative process 
compel the conclusion that Congress cannot be counted upon to over-
rule all decisions that are widely considered bad or wrong. Even if a 
substantial number of congresspersons are made aware of, and disa-
gree with, such decisions, the strong gravitational force of the status 
quo will often stand in the way of legislative action. These realities 
cast doubt on whether, all other things being equal, making the legisla-
' 101. The process of constitutional amendment is generally considered far too onerous to 
serve as a meaningful corrective force. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978); 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Stone, 
Precedent, The Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POLY. 67, 68 (1988). 
102. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra notes 48-100 and accompanying text. 
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ture the exclusive forum for overruling statutory precedents is a sensi-
ble allocation of resources. 
The problems with the task-splitting argument go well beyond 
these questions about Congress' ability to respond to judicial decisions, 
however. Even if these barriers to legislative reaction did not exist, it 
would still be necessary to explain why Congress, and not the Court, 
ought to be the institution to overrule statutory precedents. That Con-
gress is available for the task does not mean that it is advisable to 
assign the job to Congress. The Court is, after all, also available. 
Although many students of the judicial process contend that the 
courts (particularly the Supreme Court) are overworked, and should 
be spared whatever tasks can be assigned to some other branch, 105 stu-
dents of the legislative process have identical arguments about Con-
gress' burdens.106 Husbands and wives may find it sensible to take a 
"you wash the dishes, I'll dry them" approach to chores, but dividing 
functions between Congress and the courts surely calls for a more re-
fined analysis. 
To the extent the task-splitting argument is merely a pragmatic 
one, it must come to terms with these objections. It is far from clear 
that it can. Yet failure of this rationale does not mean that a height-
ened or absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, which assigns to Con-
gress the task of overruling statutory precedents, must necessarily fail. 
Such a rule may be based on more fundamental principles than effi-
cient allocation of resources. Part III of this article proposes and de-
fends the position that there are strong, normative reasons for 
assigning the task of revisiting statutory interpretations to Congress. 
If that is the case, pragmatic objections concerning Congress' respon-
siveness and workload need not, and cannot, be dispositive. 107 
B. There's More to Life Than Getting It Right 
Daniel Farber recently advanced a distinctive rationale in support 
105. See Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Tribunal A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, at 86, 
88 ("[W]e need something more to deal with the avalanche of cases coming to the Supreme 
Court."); Marcotte, Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 22 ("[T]he federal 
court system is like a city in the arid part of this country which is using every bit of its water to 
supply current needs."). See generally s. EsTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE 
SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 15-24 (1986) (discussing perception of Supreme Court's workload); R. 
POSNER, supra note 5, at 59-93 (discussing the "extent and causes of the caseload explosion" in 
the federal courts). 
106. See, e.g., D. VOGLER & S. WALDMAN, supra note 60, at 105; Davidson, Subcommittee 
Government: New Channels for Policy Making, in THE NEW CONGRESS 110 (T. Mann & N. 
Ornstein eds. 1981). 
107. See infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text. 
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of a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis. 108 He suggests that the 
majority coalition of legislators at the time of the original enactment of 
a statute is not overly concerned with having courts correct future 
mistaken judicial interpretations of the statute: 
At the time of enactment, members of the winning coalition have no way 
of knowing whether judicial mistakes will favor them (giving them more 
than the original "bargain") or injure them (giving them less than they 
bargained for). Provided courts make a good faith effort to interpret 
statutes correctly, legislators can expect both kinds of mistakes to hap-
pen with equal likelihood, so the expected cost of incorrect decisions as 
such is zero. 109 
On the other hand, he argues, legislators do have reasons to be con-
cerned about uncertainty in judicial interpretation and the accompa-
nying social costs. 110 Therefore, Farber concludes, "enacting 
legislators would prefer that courts give strong weight to stare decisis 
in statutory cases, even at the expense of fidelity to the original legisla-
tive deal."111 
Farber's attempt to tie a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis 
into supposed legislative intent fails to account for the multitude of 
factors that must go into assessing Congress' likely ex ante approach 
to such a rule. Fundamentally, Farber fails to consider the anticipated 
reactions of the interest groups that will suffer from a court decision 
giving them less than they believe they bargained for in the statute. 
Congress knows, as an ex ante matter, that these interest groups will 
not sit back and be satisfied with a judicial decision that they believe 
has cheated them out of what they bargained for in the initial enact-
ment. No theory about ex ante bargains made behind a veil of igno-
rance is going to keep the losers from trying to obtain a reversal of an 
adverse decision. The question then is not whether overruling judicial 
decisions should be considered, but rather which forum - Congress or 
the courts - should consider the losing group's pleas for overruling. 
Put this way, it is not at all apparent that Congress would prefer 
that the Court give strong weight to stare decisis in statutory cases. 
The effect of such a rule is to direct the losing faction's attention to 
Congress, and to require Congress to deal with the issue by overruling 
the judicial decision, by rebuffing th~ interest group, or by buying the 
faction off with some other legislative prize. All of these options can 
108. Farber, supra note 70, at 11-13. 
109. Id. at 12. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 12-13. 
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carry substantial political costs112 that members of Congress will often 
prefer to avoid. 113 Aside from these political costs, there are obvious 
opportunity costs that Congress incurs when it spends time addressing 
one particular issue as opposed to another. 114 On the other hand, 
there are some cases in which Congress would be expected to welcome 
the opportunity to tune up legislation as a favor to a particularly influ-
ential or wealthy group. 
These factors will weigh differently in each case, and it is hard to 
imagine any method of predicting accurately how they will interact. 
This uncertainty precludes any blanket characterization that Con-
gress, as a general rule, prefers that courts accord heightened defer-
ence to statutory precedents. If a heightened or absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis is to be the rule, it must have stronger justifica-
tion than these questionable appraisals of Congress' ex ante, unarticu-
lated, wishes. 
III. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS APPROACH TO STATUTORY 
STARE DECISIS 
If the only justification for a heightened rule of statutory stare de-
cisis were the belief that Congress necessarily agrees with the decisions 
which it fails to overrule, or that it is efficient to allocate the job of 
overruling precedents to Congress, it seems clear the rule would have 
to be abandoned. But there is another explanation for the doctrine 
that has to be addressed before a heightened rule of statutory stare 
decisis can be rejected. This theory relies on a normative vision of the 
judicial and legislative functions that considers the federal judiciary's 
hesitance to overrule statutory precedents an important element in the 
proper division of responsibility between Congress and the courts. 
112. Indeed, initial ambiguity in a statute often results from Congress' unwillingness to make' 
hard political choices. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
113. Farber predicates his analysis on the idealistic assumption that after the statute is ini-
tially construed "the enacting legislator's main interest is in minimizing social costs." Farber, 
supra note 70, at 13. Although this article shares some of Farber's concern with exaggerating the 
import of public choice theory, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 
TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987), the public interest model that this characterization of legislators' 
interest appears to adopt also seems exaggerated. 
114. This was the thrust of the amicus brief filed by 66 senators and 116 congresspersons in 
support of the petitioner in Patterson: "Any congressional effort to change a decision of this 
Court could prove divisive and time consuming, could well be delayed by disagreement over 
collateral issues, and could confront grave difficulties in addressing the nuances that have arisen 
from case-by-case elaboration of the statute." Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate 
and 118 Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 6, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107). 
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A. Lawmaking by the Judiciary 
One of the central premises of the Constitution's division of pow-
ers, and the American system of government, is that the primary fed-
eral lawmaking authority belongs to Congress. If separation of powers 
means anything, it means that the task of creating law falls upon the 
legislature, and that courts must obey and enforce the constitutionally 
legitimate enactments of the legislative branch. 115 It is the legislative 
branch which, to some degree or another, 116 is answerable to the peo-
ple, "the only legitimate fountain of power."117 
It is this doctrine of legislative supremacy that fuels the conven-
tional approach to statutory interpretation - in which courts seek to 
implement the value choices and decisions arrived at by the represen-
tative branch. 118 In a perfect world there would be no tension between 
this judicial function and the notion oflegislative supremacy. For in a 
perfect world, the legislature would be able to contemplate and pro-
vide for all contingencies in advance, settle all disputes about the effect 
115. See Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: 
An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761 (1989) (arguing that this aspect of 
separation of powers is based on the "ultimate nonnative political premise" of a "fundamentally 
democratic society"); see also Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1989) ("When a court refuses to follow an admittedly constitutional 
statute, it is arrogating to itself the ultimate power to make public policy."); Maltz, Statutory 
Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentiona/ist Approach, 63 TUL. 
L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (describing the "deeply-embedded premise of the American political system" 
that the legislature "has authority to prescribe rules oflaw that, until changed legislatively, bind 
all other governmental actors within the system"). For a discussion of some historical and polit-
ical writings that support this principle, see Redish, supra, at n.2. For an argument that this 
principle finds its source in the Constitution's supremacy clause, see Farber, supra. On the other 
hand, for a jurisprudential attack on the premise oflegislative supremacy that takes little account 
of separation of powers, see Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113 (1988) 
(rejecting positivist view that judges are bound to enforce constitutional laws that a legislature 
passes). 
116. To be sure, the Congress is far from a bastion of pure democratic decisionmaking. To 
begin with, the Constitution imposes a variety of procedural rules on Congress - rules whose 
design and effect are to make the legislative process something far different than a national plebi-
scite. Bicameralism and the presidential veto power virtually guarantee that not all legislation 
supported by a majority of citizens at a given time will be enacted into law. See supra notes 55-57 
and accompanying text. Other aspects of the legislative process, such as log-rolling, lobbying, 
the committee system, and cyclical voting, although not constitutionally mandated, also contrib-
ute to the somewhat nonmajoritarian nature of the Congress. But these phenomena are not 
enough to displace the legislature's claim to being the most representative branch of government. 
For a more detailed discussion of these points, see J. CHOPER, supra note 57, at 29-45. 
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
118. "As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these 
statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve." Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights 
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979). See generally J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 32 (1982) 
("The standard criterion for proper interpretation of a statute is to find the 'intention of the 
legislature.'"); R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 240 (1988) (legislature gives "commands to 
its subordinates in our government system, the judges who apply legislation in specific cases"); 
Maltz, supra note 115, at 3 ("The Supreme Court has generally proclaimed that ascertaining 
legislative intent is the touchstone of statutory interpretation.''). 
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of the statute, and overcome all ambiguity in transmitting its decisions 
to the judiciary and the public. 119 If a legislature were able to accom-
plish all of these goals, the judicial function in statutory interpretation 
would be relatively passive. The court would discover what the legis-
lature said about the case before it, and would apply its discovery to 
the case at hand. 
Alas, our world is far from perfect. Language is frequently ambig-
uous, 120 and it is often impossible to discover any legislative intent 
about an issue which a court needs to decide.121 In many instances, 
the generality of the statutory language seems to be a purposeful invi-
tation to the courts to develop a body of law, 122 reflecting Congress' 
inability or unwillingness to make certain hard political choices.123 
When faced with statutes whose language and context admit of differ-
ing interpretations, a court must necessarily become creative. The 
conventional view is that at this point the court must try to determine 
what approach to the question before it fits best with the vision that 
the enacting legislature (or some relevant portion of it) appeared to 
share. 124 Some advocate, however, that the court should take a more 
dynamic approach, updating the statute to reflect current values, and 
perhaps trying to integrate those values with those articulated by the 
statute's framers and ratifiers. 125 Even if a judge adopts one of the 
119. I leave aside the possibility that in a perfect world there would be no need for legisla· 
tion, or, for that matter, legislators. 
120. Recognizing the ambiguity of much language is not inconsistent with the position I took 
with respect to the plain meaning of the eleventh amendment's words in a previous article, Mar-
shall, Fighting the Words of The Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989). In 
arguing that the amendment's words leave little room for flexible interpretation, that article 
stressed the "unusual determinacy" of those provisions. Id. at 1349. 
121. This statement seems uncontroversial. The arguments begin when one tries to make 
claims about just how often language and context can or cannot compel certain results. See 
generally D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 561 (1989); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Solum, On the Indeter· 
minacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
122. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), is perhaps the most prominent example. As 
Wellington and Albert put it: "The only thing that can realistically be called the legislative 
purpose underlying such delegations is that the courts are to fashion law in accordance with their 
own notions of sound policy." Wellington & Albert, supra note 76, at 1561. For an argument 
that the Sherman Act need not (as a matter of legislative history), and should not (as a matter of 
constitutional theory), be treated as so open-ended, see Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: 
Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 266 (1986). 
123. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
124. There is considerable debate about the level of abstraction this inquiry should take. See 
generally Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process 
Era, 48 U. P1rr. L. REV. 691 (1987); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: 
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894-98 (1982). No matter 
what view is adopted, however, there arises the necessity of considerable guesswork about the 
legislature's unarticulated goals and understandings. 
125. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 40; R. DWORKIN, supra note 90; Eskridge, supra note 95. 
For an approach that attempts to blend originalism with the updating function, see Farber & 
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more originalist methodologies, she is left with little choice but to rely 
on her own guesses about legislative intent or purpose, colored as they 
are by her own value judgments. 126 As for the more dynamic ap-
proaches, they openly give the judge substantial leeway in surveying 
the legal and social culture as part of the interpretive process. Under 
either model, "interpretation is inescapably a kind of legislation."127 
The frequency of disagreement among judges and Justices in statu-
tory cases illustrates this point. 128 Different readers frequently reach 
different conclusions about what statutes mean, and unless the readers 
are outright dishonest, these differences can likely be attributed to the 
personality traits and political values these readers bring to their per-
ception of the statute.129 As then-Justice Rehnquist observed: 
What can explain five to four or four to three decisions of appellate 
courts by judges all sworn to faithfully uphold the same laws and the 
same Constitution, other than a difference in attitude or outlook, which 
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 461-65 (1988) (suggesting 
that the court should make its best guess about the views of the Congress that passed the statute, 
but should also take into account current norms in assessing the potential dangers of making an 
interpretational mistake in one direction or another). 
126. The interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is 
exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires one body of public servants, the judges, to 
construe the meaning of what another body, the legislators, has said. Obviously there is 
danger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative purposes will be unconsciously influenced 
by the judges' own views or by factors not considered by the enacting body. 
United States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940). 
127. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1259, 1269 (1947); see also R. DICKERSON, supra note 46, at 252 ("American courts now 
accept the fact that in interpreting and applying statutes they are regularly involved, however 
incidentally, in making law."). Robert Weisberg explains that "although discussing a statute's 
larger purpose may be an attractive and necessary approach where the court cannot discern the 
'specific intent' of the legislature, this interpretive tool always verges on 'spurious interpretation' 
- a barely disguised form of judicial legislation." Weisberg, supra note 81, at 215 (footnote 
omitted). 
128. An analysis of the Supreme Court's signed opinions for its October 1986 Term showed 
that 31 % (20 out of 64) of its cases primarily involving statutory interpretation were decided by 
unanimous votes, as compared to 15% (11 out of 71) of its cases primarily involving constitu-
tional interpretation. Thirteen of the statutory decisions that divided the Court were decided by 
5-4 votes, meaning that 20% (13 out of 64) of the Court's statutory decisions were decided by a 
margin of one vote. By way of comparison, 38% of the Court's constitutional decisions (27 out 
of 71) were decided by 5-4 votes. A full understanding of these figures would require subtle 
analysis of the Court's certiorari practice and the willingness of Justices to dissent on various 
issues. Even standing alone, however, the figures give some sense of the practical indefiniteness 
of many statutes (especially those that the Supreme Court addresses, cf Schauer, supra note 39, 
at 409-10). Among the lower federal courts, the frequency of circuit splits on statutory matters 
has spawned repeated calls for the establishment of an intercircuit tribunal. See Meador, A Com-
ment on the Chief Justice's Proposal, A.B.A. J., April 1983, at 447, 449. 
129. See generally D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 134-71 
(1976) (analyzing predictability of individual Justices' decisions); Gottschall, Reagan's Appoint-
ments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 
48 (1986) (describing voting propensities offederaljudges appointed by Democratic and Republi-
can presidents); Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 1551 (1966) (evaluating efforts to relate background variables of judges to their decisions). 
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leads to the ascription of different meanings to the same words of a stat-
ute or of a constitutional provision?130 
These individuals' views and preconceptions are, in tum, the product 
of "'the political, economic and moral prejudices' of the judge."131 
Nonunanimous results do not necessarily demonstrate that some Jus-
tices are being unfaithful to their best reading of the statute. They 
simply reflect the flexibility of language and the inevitability that read-
ers will view language through their own always-tinted lenses. 132 
By what right does the judiciary exercise this creative power?133 In 
explaining why they have devoted so much attention to this funda-
mental question with respect to the nondemocratic aspects of judicial 
review for constitutionality, but so little attention to this question as it 
relates to statutory interpretation, commentators have pointed repeat-
edly to the conditional nature of statutory, but not constitutional, 
decisions.134 Michael Perry, for one example, dismisses any 
countermajoritarian concern about statutory interpretation by declar-
ing that "whatever policy choices the judiciary makes in nonconstitu-
tional cases are subject to revision by the ordinary processes of 
electorally accountable policymaking. In that sense, nonconstitutional 
policymaking by the judiciary is electorally accountable, even if the 
judges themselves are not."135 
There is no doubt that the potential for congressional override sig-
nificantly mitigates the countermajoritarian difficulty of statutory in-
terpretation; but it is wrong to treat this potential as a solution to the 
problem altogether. As the earlier discussion of Congress' prospective 
ability to overrule precedents demonstrates, there are difficulties in re-
lying too heavily on the congressional power to overrule decisions as a 
130. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 694, 709 
(1973). 
131. J. FRANK, supra note 39, at 105; see also Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 
MICH. L. REv. 827, 828 (1988) (many decisions depend on the "policy judgments, political pref· 
erences and ethical values of the judges"). 
132. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 771 (1982). See generally 
S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). 
133. Any reader tempted to dismiss this challenge as trivial is asked to consider the decision 
in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), where the Court was forced to determine 
whether Congress' prohibition of racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 included a prohibition on a race-based affirmative action plan agreed upon by an employer 
and a union. It is widely recognized both that there is very little guidance from Congress on the 
point, and that the question is, one of the most politically divisive and sensitive that America has 
faced in this generation. Surely a system that allows a non-accountable judiciary to make a 
decision such as this demands justification. 
134. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 20 (1962); J. CHOPER, supra 
note 57, at 132; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, 
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28 n.* (1982). 
135. See M. PERRY, supra note 134, at 28 n.*. 
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primary tool of legitimization.136 The serious problems of ignorance 
and inertia confirm that "[w]hat Congress can do theoretically may 
not be in fact practicable."137 Even if the power of statutory interpre-
tation is simply the "power to make temporary rules and thereby to 
assign the burden of overcoming inertia and of getting those rules re-
vised, "138 it is a substantial power and requires justification.139 
We return, therefore, to the basic question: By what right does the 
judiciary exercise the power to make political choices in the course of 
statutory interpretation? When a similar challenge is posed with re-
spect to the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review, commenta-
tors typically respond by focusing on the basically nonmajoritarian 
nature of the Cons.titution itself. 140 An important function of the Con-
136. "The theoretical possibility of congressional override cannot disguise the fact that law-
making by federal courts would in most cases give the last word to the federal courts rather than 
to Congress." Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23 
(1985); see also A. BICKEL, supra note 134, at 206; G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 6. 
137. McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 Haus. L. REV. 
354, 364 (1966). For example, one observer found "the relative infrequency of Congressional 
response" to Supreme Court antitrust and labor law opinions decided between 1950 and 1972 to 
be "striking." Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Re-
sponse, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441, 453 (1983). 
138. G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 93. 
139. Some might argue that these observations about the practical barriers to overruling judi-
cial decisions should be ignored in determining whether the potential for congressional override 
legitimizes judicial lawmaking. Perry, for example, recognizes the force of inertia, but argues 
that 
[t]he burden oflegislative inertia operates throughout our governmental system to give legis-
lative minorities more (negative) power than they would otherwise enjoy. (That state of 
affairs is certainly not inconsistent with the principle of electorally accountable policymak-
ing - unless we are now to pronounce policymaking by the United States Congress as 
electorally unaccountable!) 
M. PERRY, supra note 134, at 134. The quoted passage is from Perry's defense of his argument 
that Congress' power to control federal jurisdiction has a legitimizing effect on constitutional 
review. But he also appears to apply this reasoning to Congress' power to overrule statutory and 
common law decisions, and hence dismisses any countermajoritarian difficulty in these contexts. 
See id. at 126. 
The problem with applying Perry's argument to the process of statutory interpretation is that 
doing so ignores Perry's characterization of the minority's power as a "negative" one. The many 
constitutional and institutional impediments to enacting legislation reflect strong societal biases 
against legislative action and in favor of the status quo. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying 
text. Thus, Perry is correct in concluding that Congress' failure to legislate in a specific area 
cannot be condemned as illegitimate even if it is clear that Congress would have acted but for the 
burden of inertia. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. But it is far different to con-
clude that affirmative legislative decisions by unaccountable actors (the courts) can be fully legiti-
mized by Congress' inertia-induced failure to respond. Judicial interpretations of statutes often 
have the effect of extending the scope or force of an enactment. For example, in the Runyon line 
of cases, see supra note 45, the Court extended the force of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to a wide range of 
private discriminatory activity. If it is a small minority of congresspersons that has prevented 
Congress from overruling the Court's construction of the statute, then a minority of Congress 
has been wielding far more than the "negative" effect that is purposely built into the system. The 
combination of an unaccountable court and a minority of the legislature will have effectively 
legislated, which is a very different function from simply acting as a check on, or possessing veto 
authority over, the majority's attempts to legislate. 
140. If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their 
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stitution is to bind the majority to certain procedures and to preclude 
the majority from certain activities. It is quite understandable, there-
fore, that the insulated judiciary is given the task of interpreting and 
applying the Constitution. Giving the job to any other body, the argu-
ment goes, is akin to arming Ulysses with a knife to loosen his bonds 
in the event that he decides to approach the Sirens after all.141 Legis-
lative supremacy is not an effective objection to judicial review because 
the legislature does not have supreme authority to violate the Consti-
tution. Along with their authority to enforce the Constitution, judges 
necessarily have the responsibility of interpreting the Constitution, for 
what other branch could possibly possess that authority without call-
ing into question the countermajoritarian force of the Constitution?142 
It is a bit more difficult to tell a convincing story about the legiti-
macy oflawmaking through statutory interpretation. Unlike constitu-
tional interpretation, the creative aspects of statutory interpretation 
cannot be justified by the need for a check on the validity of legislative 
enaetments. Except in the rare case where one reading of a statute 
would raise doubts about the statute's constitutionality, 143 courts en-
gaged in statutory interpretation perform no reviewing function. 144 
Rather, the courts, the most electorally non-accountable body of gov-
ernment, routinely choose between a variety of possible constructions 
of a legislative act, any one of which the legislature could have legiti-
mately chosen. 
The answer to the legitimacy challenge is, ultimately, a pragmatic 
one. In the course of adjudicating cases it is often essential for courts 
own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other 
departments, it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is not 
to be collected from any particular provisions in the constitution ...• It is far more rational 
to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and 
the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to 
their authority. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
141. As the story goes, Ulysses instructed his sailors: "if I beg you to release me, you must 
tighten and add to my bonds." HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 193 (Penguin Classics ed. 1946). 
142. "[N]o constitutional theorist contends that the legislative or the executive branch of the 
federal government has as great an institutional capacity as the judicial branch, much less a 
greater capacity, to exercise interpretive review, to enforce the framers' value judgments." M. 
PERRY, supra note 134, at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
143. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); 2A N. SINGER, SUTH· 
ERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 45.11 (4th ed. 1984). 
144. While "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is," ... it is equally - and emphatically - the exclusive province of the 
Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but 
also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its dele-
gated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the executive to 
administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought. 
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
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to decide how an act of Congress applies. 145 There is no option of 
deferring consideration of the question - a decision has to be reached 
for the sake of the parties and for the sake of establishing a reasonable 
level of certainty so interested observers may plan their conduct.146 
To be sure, there are substantial values served by having courts, rather 
than Congress or the Executive, exercise the judicial power. These 
values include procedural fairness, protection against ex post laws, 
separation of prosecutorial and judicial functions, and general goals of 
principled decisionmaking. Judicial policymaking, however, is not 
one of the functions which ought to be extolled as part of the courts' 
ideal role in adjudicating cases involving federal statutes.147 The judi-
ciary's practice of making difficult value choices in the course of inter-
preting statutes does not find its justification in the intrinsic value of 
judicial involvement in that process. It is, rather, an inevitable and 
perhaps unfortunate byproduct of the need to adjudicate actual cases. 
As Justice Hugo Black asserted: "The Court undertakes the task of 
interpretation . . . not because the Court has any special ability to 
fathom the intent of Congress, but rather because interpretation is un-
avoidable in the decision of the case before it."148 
That some level of judicial lawmaking is inevitable does not pro-
vide an excuse for totally ignoring the countermajoritarian difficulty 
with statutory interpretation, however. To the extent that the law-
making role of the judiciary can be reduced or eliminated without im-
pairing the courts' adjudicative function, there is no excuse for not 
proceeding in that direction. Corresponding to the two major factors 
that cause the problem with statutory interpretation - judicial crea-
tivity and congressional passivity - there are two complementary ap-
proaches to reducing the concern over the judiciary's lawmaking 
function. 
First, one could focus on the judicial role, and try to reduce the 
creativity that judges exercise in interpreting statutes. It is important 
145. See Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a 
Democratic Society, 67 low AL. REV. 711, 717-21 (1982); Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty 
to Decide a Case, 1985 u. ILL L. REV. 573, 579-87. 
146. "Inevitably our resolution of cases or controversies requires us to close interstices in 
federal law from time to time .... " West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987). See generally 
Mishkin, The Variousness of ''Federal Law'': Competence and Discretion in the Choice of Na-
tional and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1957). 
147. "Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the 
basis of the judges' personal policy preferences." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
148. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 257 (1970) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
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to recognize, though, that it will never be possible to eliminate the 
necessity for judicial policy choices in the course of interpreting stat-
utes. As William Popkin recently noted in defending his "collabora-
tive model of statutory interpretation," there simply "is no such thing 
as a noncollaborative way for courts to approach statutes."149 
The second way of approaching the problem is to examine Con-
gress' role in the enterprise of statutory interpretation. Recall that 
much of the countermajoritarian difficulty with modem statutory in-
terpretation is attributed to the perception that Congress' oversight of 
the courts' statutory decisions is not as energetic as it might be. 
Although legal scholars have tended to ignore the congressional side 
of the equation, it seems reasonable to conclude that if the level of 
congressional involvement can be increased (thus making the courts' 
decisions look much more like conditional decisions) then at least 
some of the countermajoritarian difficulty will be reduced. Hence, one 
way to deal with the problem of judicial lawmaking is to adopt meas-
ures that will make congressional oversight a more realistically legiti-
mizing element in statutory interpretation. As the next section 
describes, invoking a heightened rule, or better yet an absolute rule, of 
statutory stare decisis is a step in this direction. 
B. The Role of an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis 
The tension between the lawmaking aspects of statutory interpreta-
tion and principles of democratic self-governance forms the core of the 
separation-of-powers-based approach to a heightened or absolute rule 
of statutory stare decisis. Justice Black, perhaps the Court's strongest 
advocate of a strong rule of statutory stare decisis, sketched out one 
way in which uneasiness with judicial creativity re1ates to stare decisis: 
When the law has been settled by an earlier case[,] then any subsequent 
"reinterpretation" of the statute is gratuitous and neither more nor less 
than an amendment: it is no different from a judicial alteration of lan-
guage that Congress itself placed in the statute. 
Altering the important provisions of a statute is a legislative function. 
And the Constitution states simply and unequivocally: "All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States 
,,150 
According to Black, because the absolute need to fill a gap in a statute 
occurs just once, any subsequent revisitations of the issue cannot find 
legitimacy under the banner of adjudicative necessity. The court 
149. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 
627 (1988). Popkin's collaborative model views courts as participating "through case law deci-
sions in the process of public deliberation to develop political values." Id. at 591. 
150. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 257-58 (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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might believe that the statute was interpreted wrongly, and that the 
interpretation ought to be changed; but these are basically legislative, 
rather than adjudicative, concerns.151 Once the statute has been inter-
preted, any change in direction can be left for Congress. 
Taken alone, Justice Black's position appears to be a bit shallow. 
He is, of course, correct that an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis 
is bound to limit the number of cases in which judges make policy 
choices. It is obvious that if courts are willing to decide each statutory 
issue just once, the number of times that the courts decide statutory 
issues will be smaller than if the courts are willing to reconsider the 
issue after an initial decision. But limiting the numerical incidence of 
judicial lawmaking episodes in that narrow sense is not obviously con-
sistent with the goal of limiting the lawmaking role of the courts in 
statutory interpretation. Indeed, one might persuasively argue that 
the lawmaking character of statutory interpretation is intensified by a 
strong rule of stare decisis for the rule gives statute-like permanence to 
judge-made law. To those concerned with lawmaking by the judiciary, 
therefore, it makes little sense to talk quantitatively, without consider-
ing the effects that a heightened or absolute rule of statutory stare de-
cisis is likely to have on the relationship between Congress and the 
courts. 
Analyzing those effects suggests that aside from decreasing the in-
cidence of judicial lawmaking, adopting a heightened or absolute rule 
of statutory stare decisis could reduce the significance of judicial law-
making. If the relationship between Congress and the courts could be 
changed so as to make the specter of congressional oversight of statu-
tory precedents more of a reality, the legitimacy of judicial involve-
ment in initially interpreting statutes would become far less difficult to 
justify. If a more active colloquy between the branches could be stim-
ulated, the potential for congressional override then could be realisti-
cally treated as a meaningful legitimizing factor in the interpretive 
process. The courts' interpretations then could be treated more like 
conditional rules, and there would be less need to be concerned with 
the unaccountable nature of the courts.152 
151. In the final analysis, a Justice's vote in a case like this depends more on his or her 
views about the respective lawmaking responsibilities of Congress and this Court than on 
conflicting policy interests. Judges who have confidence in their own ability to fashion pub-
lic policy are less hesitant to change law than those of us who are inclined to give wide 
latitude to the views of the voters' representatives on nonconstitutional matters. · 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1923 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., with whom Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., joined, dissenting) (majority opinion over-
ruled Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
152. Of course, making the prospect for judicial overrule more meaningful does not necessar-
ily legitimize the enterprise of unnecessarily creative statutory interpretation. That "the legisla-
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How, though, could a heightened or absolute rule of statutory 
stare decisis stimulate increased congressional involvement in moni-
toring statutory interpretation? It would do so by articulating a clear 
and unyielding division of responsibility. As Dean Edward Levi 
explained: 
Legislatures and courts are cooperative law-making bodies. It is impor-
tant to know where the responsibility lies. If legislation which is dis-
favored can be interpreted away from time to time, then it is not to be 
expected, particularly if controversy is high, that the legislature will ever 
act. It will always be possible to say that new legislation is not needed 
because the court in the future will make a more appropriate interpreta-
tion. If the court is to have freedom to reinterpret legislation, the result 
will be to relieve the legislature from pressure .... Therefore it seems 
better to say that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has 
been made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap of 
ambiguity, the courts should take that direction as given.153 
Seen in this light, judicial overruling of statutory precedents is not 
only unnecessary to the adjudicative process, but it serves to lessen the 
level of congressional involvement in overseeing and overruling the 
courts' statutory decisions. If Congress and interested parties believe 
that statutory decisjons can be overruled either by Congress or by the 
courts, the pressure on Congress to become involved is reduced. 154 
Because the Court has never consistently applied a heightened or 
absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, there is no empirical data 
available to prove or disprove the hypothesis that such a rule would 
trigger increased congressional oversight of statutory interpretation. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of models that may help predict the 
consequences of such a rule. Imagine two legal systems that are iden-
tical except in one respect. One deals with statutory precedents as it 
does other kinds of precedents: it is willing to overrule them. The 
other system, by contrast, steadfastly refuses to reconsider any statu-
ture can protect itself against judicial invasion of its sphere does not justify that invasion in the 
first place." .Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1117, 1128 (1978); see also Merrill, supra note 136, at 22. Whether the "dynamic" forms of 
statutory interpretation referred to in this article represent such invasions is a difficult question 
and is beyond the scope of this article. 
153. E. LEVI, supra note 38, at 32. 
154. Justice Stevens has made a similar point, dissenting in Commissioner of Internal Reve· 
nue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987): 
Moreover, if Congress understands that as long as a statute is interpreted in a consistent 
manner, it will not be reexamined by the courts except in the most extraordinary circum-
stances, Congress will be encouraged to give close scrutiny to judicial interpretations of its 
work product. We should structure our principles of statutory construction to invite contin-
uing congressional oversight of the interpretive process. 
483 U.S. at 104; see also Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1923 (Stevens, J., dissenting); McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tory precedents. In which system can Congress be expected to pay 
more attention to a judicial decision interpreting a statute? 
There should be a marginally higher level of congressional over-
sight in the system in which courts apply a heightened or absolute rule 
of statutory stare decisis. For in that system the legislators, lobbyists, 
and public all know that any changes in the interpretation of statutes 
can come only through legislative action - not through a judicial re-
versal of the announced interpretation. Thus, legislat9rs will not have 
the luxury of putting off action in anticipation of a judicial decision, or 
perhaps more importantly, placating their constituents or those who 
exert pressure upon them by convincing them that there remains the 
prospect for judicial self-correction.155 By the same token, groups and 
individuals interested in changing the rule will focus all of their atten-
tion on the legislature, rather than diluting their energy by continuing 
their attempts to effectuate change in the courts through litigation as 
well. 
Public choice theory teaches that legislators have strong incentives 
to avoid alienating interest groups whenever possible. When there are 
strong competing factions on an issue, the legislature will often pass 
the buck to an agency, or to the courts, by enacting a vaguely worded 
statute that offers each side of the controversy some hope of ultimately 
prevailing.156 This same desire to avoid controversy or to "shift re-
sponsibility"157 helps explain congressional inaction where judicial de-
cisions have stimulated strong negative sentiment. By pointing to the 
possibility that the courts will revisit the issue, or by otherwise sug-
gesting that the issue is best dealt with by the judiciary, a legislator can 
avoid the political heat that sponsoring or voting for legislation to 
overrule the decision may spark. An absolute rule of statutory stare 
decisis takes away that opportunity, and at least a marginal increase in 
congressional reaction and attention should be expected to accompany 
its adoption. 
In addition to reducing the pressure on Congress to confront 
thorny political issues, the possibility of judicial reversal deters con-
gressional action in another respect. There is a limited number of is-
155. Cf. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Stat-
utory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. R.Ev. 275, 288 (1988) (the "dilemma of the ungrateful electorate" 
tends to hold legislators more accountable for their actions than for their passiveness). 
156. See T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, 
A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1 (1982); Fiorina, Legislative Choice of 
Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 Pua. CHOICE 33 (1982); Shepsle, 
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 555 
(1972); see also M. HAYES, supra note 53. 
157. Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 156, at 60. 
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sues with which any Congress can deal. 158 In choosing among 
potential subjects for attention, reasonable legislators should be ex-
pected to take into account the possibility that the problem will solve 
itself, or that someone else may solve it. All other things being equal, 
therefore, the utility-maximizing decision under these circumstances is 
to press for the legislation on the subject over which the legislature has 
exclusive control, while hoping that the other problem (reversing judi-
cial interpretation) will be solved by the courts. 159 If the possibility of 
judicial overruling js eliminated, legislative consideration of court de-
cisions will be put on a par with other items on the legislative 
agenda. 160 
This prediction is consistent with basic principles of organizational 
design theory. Diffusion of responsibility and authority has been 
shown to pose significant barriers to responsive action within an or-
ganization. Henry Fayol wrote of the need to define clearly the scope 
of actors' responsibility and authority, and to make sure that the scope 
of responsibility is commensurate with the scope of authority. 161 One 
of the essential principles of delegation is to avoid "overlaps" and 
"splits" of responsibility that tend to reduce any one individual's sense 
that she must be the one to act. 162 To help facilitate decisionmaking, 
one author advocates that a specific person be designated the deci-
sionmaker for every decision area. 163 "He alone would be empowered 
to make the decision. His responsibility to decide would be nontrans-
ferable; it could not be delegated. The areas for which he would have 
decision-making authority would be clear to him and, equally impor-
tant, clear to everyone else in the company."164 
158. See supra note 63·64 and accompanying text. 
159. If VJ and V2 are the values of enacting two pieces of legislation (issues 1 and 2), and P2 
is the probability that courts will change the rule with respect to issue 2, then a legislature with 
limited resources will choose to deal with issue 1 as long as VJ + P2 V2 > V2. 
160. In that event, Congress will choose option 1 only if VJ > V2. The effect should be to 
increase the lik~lihood of congressional reversal of decisions. It must be noted, however, that 
under this model some other legislation will be crowded out by Congress' devoting more time to 
reconsidering statutory interpretations. Whether this cost is tolerable depends on one's norma· 
tive views on the importance oflegislative involvement in the interpretive process. See infra note 
288 and accompanying text. 
161. See H. FAYOL, GENERAL AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 21 (1949). 
162. "An 'overlap' occurs when responsibilities fall under the accountability of two or more 
executives. A responsibility is 'split' when it is carried out by more than one organizational 
unit." R. ALBANESE, MANAGING TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PERFORMANCE 542 (1978). 
163. Ford & Bursk, Organizing for Faster Decisions, MGMT. REV., April 1971, at 5. See 
generally D. MCCONKEY, No NONSENSE DELEGATION 169-70 (1974); J. MOONEY & A. REI· 
LEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION 29-30 (1939); L. URWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF AD· 
MINISTRATION (1947). 
164. Ford & Bursk, supra note 163, at 9. An old Scottish ballad captures the diffusion of 
responsibility point in this way: 
The Wind sae cauld blew south and north, 
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Studies in the area of social psychology, spawned by the famed 
Kitty Genevese murder case in New York City,165 confirm the effects 
that unitary responsibility can have in triggering individual action. A 
series of studies have tested bystander reaction to emergency situa-
tions, comparing the reactions of subjects who believe they are the 
only ones in a position to help with the reactions of subjects who be-
lieve there are others in a position to help as well. Those who thought 
that they were the lone hope of the victim were considerably more 
likely to act. 166 Of course, tort law has long recognized this phenome-
non. Although a bystander generally has no duty to act, one who cre-
ates the impression that she is responding to the emergency has a duty 
to carry through, because "the belief that a rescue [is] in process may 
lead superior rescuers to pass by, making the victim worse off than he 
would have been had the first rescuer not chanced on the scene."167 
When the court appears to be a potential rescuer (whose work is con-
tinuously in progress), the victim (society suffering from the poor ini-
tial decision) might be worse off than if the court took a hands-off 
approach. For as between the courts and Congress, no one would ar-
gue that the courts may play as active a role in reconsidering and up-
dating statutes as Congress may play.16s 
The effect that anticipated court involvement can have on congres-
sional willingness to deal with issues has been noted in the area of 
constitutional decisionmaking. Writing in 1893, James Thayer argued 
that the specter of judicial review tends to dissipate Congress' feeling 
And blew into the floor; 
Quoth our goodman to our goodwife, 
"Gae out and bar the door." 
"My hand is in my hussyfskap. 
Good man, as ye may see; 
An it should nae be barred this hundred year, 
t s' no be barred for me." 
Gel Up and Bar the Door, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY 102 (A. Eastman 2d ed. 
1970). The poem goes on to relate a series of tragic events caused by the refusal of each to be the 
one to get up and bar the door. 
165. Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1, 
col. 4. 
166. See B. LATANE & J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE 
HELP? (1970); Darley & Latane, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 8 J. PERS. & Soc. PSY-
CHOLOGY 377 (1968). 
167. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 314, 323 (1965); 
W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 378-82 (5th ed. 1984); M. SHAPO, THE DUTY 
TO ACT (1977). 
168. As Justice Douglas, who was hardly timid in defending an active judicial role, recog-
nized: "The truth is that the reach of a law may never be appreciated by the enacting body until 
it has been passed and put into practice . . . . That is why constant legislative reappraisal of 
statutes as construed by the courts ... is a healthy practice." Douglas, Legal Institutions in 
America, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 274, 292 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959). 
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of obligation to deal with constitutional issues. 169 There are countless 
examples of an act being passed and signed based on the expectation 
that the courts would strike down the resulting statute if it contained 
any constitutional defect.17° This "abdication of [Congress'] role as a 
constitutional guardian and ... abnegation of its duty of responsible 
lawmaking"171 is hard to remedy in the constitutional setting, for few 
would argue that the judiciary should abandon its essential role of 
constitutional adjudicator. 172 But the problem is not as intractable in 
the area of statutory reinterpretation - the kingdom would not col-
lapse if only Congress could reverse the Supreme Court's construc-
tions of statutes. In any event, the factors described above, and the 
phenomenon that occurs in the constitutional area, confirm Dean 
Levi's assertion that "[i]f the Court is to have freedom to reinterpret 
legislation, the result will be to relieve the legislature from 
pressure." 173 
Judge Frank Easterbrook makes a similar point about the effect 
that the "[r]eady overruling of constitutional cases" has on the amend-
ment process. 174 He explains that the practice 
saps the drive for change in the constitutional text. People who seek 
amendment know that the Court may change the rules at any moment, 
making their campaign unnecessary or even counterproductive . . . . 
Legislators may explain their inattention to the proposed amendments 
169. J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 64-67 (1901); see also A. BICKEL, supra note 134, at 21-
22; Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 19-20. 
170. See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan's Statement on Signing the Bill Increasing the Public 
Debt Limit, II PUB. PAPERS 1471-72 (Dec. 12, 1985) (questioning constitutionality of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction bill, but signing it nonetheless); 1938 THE PUBLIC PAPERS 
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 297-98 (1941) (relying on courts to cure uncon-
stitutional legislation); see also Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. 
REV. 311, 313 n.10 (1987) (citing examples of congressional reliance on judicial review). Donald 
Morgan reported that 31% of the 187 members of Congress who responded to his questionnaire 
in 1959 answered "yes" to the following question: "Generally speaking, should Congress pass 
constitutional questions along to the courts rather than form its own considered judgment on 
them?" D. MORGAN, THE CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1966). For a more recent, 
but less formal, survey of some members' views on the issue, see Greenhouse, What's a 
Lawmaker To Do About the Constitution?, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1988, at B6, col. 3. The legisla-
ture's and executive's callousness toward constitutional questions casts serious doubt on the ex-
tent to which courts should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to legislation. See 
Comment, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and Co11-
stitutional Separations, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 204, 212 n.44 (1985) ("Amidst such reciprocal defer-
ence it is quite possible that no branch ever takes the opportunity to meaningfully apply the 
dictates of the constitution."). 
171. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, supra note 48, 
at 610. 
172. For some proposals to relieve the problem in this area, see A. BICKEL, supra note 134; J. 
THAYER, supra note 169, at 68-70; Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); Ross, supra note 170. 
173. E. LEVI, supra note 38, at 32. 
174. See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 430. 
November 1989] Statutory Stare Decisis 215 
with the refrain that the proposal may be unnecessary .... Proponents of 
the amendment perceive the gains of change as less when the Court may 
come 'round, so they work less hard. The Court's emphasis on the diffi-
culty of amending the Constitution therefore may lead, paradoxically, to 
an increased difficulty in securing a change.175 
The flaw, then, in the current system of shared authority to overrule 
statutory precedents is that no one body is given the ultimate job of 
reviewing interpretations of statutes and deciding whether they repre-
sent currently acceptable renditions of the statute's goals, or for that 
matter, whether the statute is worth keeping around at all. This diffu-
sion of authority lessens the probability of statutory development. It is 
far from clear, therefore, that C. Paul Rogers was correct when he 
asserted that "judicial unwillingness to reevaluate prior statutory in-
terpretations impedes rather than assists the development and refine-
ment of the law."I76 Rogers argues that a heightened rule of statutory 
stare decisis is problematic because, "[i]nstead of having two interde-
pendent bodies responsible for improving and advancing statutory 
law, only the legislature has responsibility after a court has once spo-
ken on the subject."I77 As anyone who has ever let a ball pass down 
the middle of the tennis court untouched while playing doubles knows, 
two heads are not always better than one.I78 
C. Defining the Contours of the Rule 
This understanding of how the Court's approach to stare decisis 
can affect Congress' behavior serves to justify the general approach the 
Court has articulated with respect to a heightened rule of statutory 
stare decisis. But in order to be truly effective, the rule should be 
transformed into an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. As long as 
there is some uncertainty about whether the Court might find a spe-
cific case to be an exception to its general principle against overruling 
a statutory precedents, Congress has the opportunity and incentive to 
avoid acting. Only an absolute rule can avoid this.I79 When Brandeis 
declared that it is often "more important that the applicable rule of 
175. Id. at 430-31. Judge Easterbrook ignores the fact that this same paradox plagues his 
own arguments about the difficulty of legislative overruling of statutory precedents: the Court's 
increased readiness to overrule statutory precedents may lead "to an increased difficulty in secur-
ing a change" through the legislative branch. 
176. Rogers, Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust 
Laws, 14 Haus. L. REV. 611, 625-26 (1977). 
177. Id. 
178. See UNITED STATES PROFESSIONAL TENNIS AssOCIATION, TENNIS: A PROFESSIONAL 
GUIDE, 143-45 (1984) (imperative that players define responsibility by calling the shot, for it is 
impossible to play doubles in silence). 
179. For a discussion of some of the advantages and disadvantages of adopting absolute 
rules, see Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). 
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law be settled than that it be settled right," 180 he apparently was refer-
ring to the public's need for certainty in planning activities. But Con-
gress must also be able to determine the current state of the law with 
certainty and to ascertain a nonmoving target at which to take aim. 
This absolute rule must have limits, however. If the burden that 
an absolute rule· of statutory stare decisis casts on Congress is so sub-
stantial that Congress cannot realistically manage it, then the goals of 
the proposal will be thwarted. Thus, it seems necessary to limit the 
rule's scope to Supreme Court decisions, in order to ensure that the 
number of decisions that Congress will be charged with monitoring is 
relatively small. 181 An argument can be made that a long line of un-. 
questioned lower court decisions should also be treated as fixed in or-
der to induce congressional scrutiny of such patterns of decisions. 182 
But there will inevitably be great uncertainty in determining whether 
there is in fact a "long line" of cases, and whether it has been "unques-
tioned." Moreover, there is no obvious mechanism through which 
Congress can be easily apprised of a long line of lower court cases. By 
contrast, it is not difficult to devise a simple method through which 
Congress could receive copies of Supreme Court opinions. The trip 
across First Street cannot be more than 200 yards. 
Of course, even with an absolute rule limited to Supreme Court 
decisions, no one can ensure that every congressperson will pay atten-
tion to every Supreme Court decision, and will carefully consider 
whether each ought to be overruled. Indeed, one can safely guarantee 
that universal scrutiny will never be achieved. But this article argues 
that it is important to look for steps that can be taken to remove some 
of the factors that lead Congress to be inert with respect to judicial 
decisions, 183 and an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis is one such 
step. 
Whether or not the adoption of a heightened or absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis will actually have its potential salutary effects 
180. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
181. In its October 1986 Tenn, the Supreme Court decided 64 statutory cases. Surely, it 
does not overly tax the capacity of Congress to ask that it be responsible for monitoring this 
modest number of decisions. See infra notes 284-87. 
182. See McNatly v. United States, 483 U.S. 89, 362-65 nn.l-5 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (citing dozens of circuit court opinions interpreting a statute over 20-year period); Shear-
son/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(discussing 32-year period in which eight circuits interpreted a statute similarly). 
183. Justice Cardozo, for example, advocated the establishment of a Ministry of Justice, 
whose job it would be to monitor the interpretation of statutes and propose legislative amend-
ments. See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice. 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921). More recently, Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has made a number of proposals aimed at improving the discourse between the branches. See 
Ginsburg, A Plea far Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995 (1987). 
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on Congress will depend, ultimately, on how faithfully justices can be 
expected to adhere to the spirit of the proposed rule. We are all too 
familiar with the spurious "distinction" of a precedent, through which 
the Court strips a precedent of its import without actually "overrul-
ing" it. It is fair to ask whether it is worthwhile to adopt a proposal 
eliminating the possibility of overruling statutory precedents if the pri-
mary effect of the new rule will be simply to foster increased "distin-
guishing" of statutory precedents. 
There seems to be little doubt that invoking an absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis will stimulate some disingenuous judges to prac-
tically overrule cases through "distinguishing" them. No system of 
precedent can fully avoid this danger. It is wrong, though, to exagger-
ate the risk. First, one would hope that most judges are not all that 
intent on manipulating accepted legal rules to reach results they de-
sire. Second, even if a significant number of judges are so inclined, 
there are a variety of social and cultural restraints that limit a judge's 
ability to ignore freely the dictates of legal rules. 
Writing in the realist tradition, Karl Llewellyn described the great 
variety of ways judges can treat precedent, 184 but also stressed that, 
given the "correct range for action which our American system has 
afforded to our appellate courts from the beginnings of the nation," 
this flexibility does not produce "an undue reckonability of results." 185 
Llewellyn presented a list of fourteen "[m]ajor [s]teadying [f]actors in 
our [a]ppellate [c]ourts" that help account for our relatively stable sys-
tem for administering justice. 186 Similarly, Duncan Kennedy, writing 
in the Critical Legal Studies mode, has identified a number of factors 
that constrain judges in their uses of legal rules. 187 Two items on his 
list deserve special note, for they apply as strongly to the judge who is 
willing to consider ignoring the rules as they do to the judge who 
genuinely seeks to follow legal rules. Assuming the voice of a liberal 
judge who is unhappily constrained by adverse precedent, Kennedy 
explains the effect of community reaction: 
[V]arious people in my community will sanction me severely if I do not 
184. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 77-91 (1960) 
(list of 64 "Available Impeccable Precedent Techniques"). 
185. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
186. "(1) Law-conditioned Officials (2) Legal Doctrine (3) Known Doctrinal Techniques (4) 
Responsibility for Justice (5) The Tradition of One Single Right Answer (6) An Opinion of the 
Court (7) A Frozen Record from Below (8) Issues Limited, Sharpened, Phrased (9) Adversary 
Argument by Counsel (10) Group Decision (11) Judicial Security and Honesty (12) A Known 
Bench (13) The General Period-Style and its Promise (14) Professional Judicial Office." Id. at 
19. 
187. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. 
LEGAL ED. 518, 527-28 (1986). 
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offer a good legal argument for my action. It is not just that I may be 
reversed and will have broken my promise. It is also that both friends 
and enemies will see me as having violated a role constraint that they 
approve of (for the most part), and they will make me feel their 
disapproval. 188 
Kennedy also goes on to describe the effect that callous treatment of 
the legal rule would have on his hypothetical judge's long-term 
agenda. "[E]very case is part of my life-project of being a liberal ac-
tivist judge. What I do in this case will affect my ability to do things in 
other cases, enhancing or diminishing my legal and political credibility 
as well as my technical reputation with the various constituencies that 
will notice."189 
These observations about the judicial culture and incentive struc-
ture support the conclusion that judges' arguments, just like other law-
yers', must pass the red face test. There are undoubtedly many cases 
at the margin where spurious distinctions will pass this test (causing 
the judge's face to become a bit flush, but not actually tum red). But 
there are also a great many cases where any effort to cast a decision as 
simply "distinguishing" a precedent will be subject to wide ridicule 
and contempt. This is particularly so when the precedent in question 
provides a verbal formulation interpreting a statute, as opposed to a 
fact-based determination in deciding particular case. 190 It is hard to 
imagine, for example, that any member of the Court in Patterson, 
much less a majority of the Court, could have pretended to distinguish 
away Runyon and announce a new rule limiting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to 
private acts of discrimination without explicitly overruling Runyon. 191 
Although there will surely be some room for evading an absolute rule 
of heightened rule of statutory stare decisis, adopting such a rule will 
have actual effects in the practice of dealing with precedents, not just 
in the labels that are used. 
Even if one agrees that an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis 
can be successful in triggering increased congressional monitoring of 
statutory interpretation, there may still be reasons to reject the propo-
sal. First, some may argue that the underlying goal of the proposal -
minimizing the judiciary's role in making statutory law - is ill-con-
ceived. Second, it might be argued that although the goal is salutary, 
188. Id. at 527. 
189. Id. at 528; see also W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 31 (1964) (even a 
judge who has little respect for technical law-court rules would find it prudent to assume such 
respect before some of the popular, bureaucratic, or political checks were applied against his 
tribunal). 
190. See J. STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW: DYNAMICS OF COMMON LAW GROWTH 32 
(1985). 
191. See supra notes 39 & 44. 
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the costs of the proposal are too high. The next sections of this article 
deal with these points. 
IV. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PROBLEM REVISITED 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the proposal advanced in 
this article is its underlying premise that there is a significant concern, 
constitutional or otherwise, with the judiciary's creative role in statu-
tory interpretation.192 Many recent commentators have taken quite 
the opposite position, extolling and encouraging judicial creativity in 
statutory interpretation. This section addresses some of the arguments 
these scholar~ have made; for if they are correct in dismissing any diffi-
culties with lawmaking by the judiciary, the proposal for an absolute 
rule, or the defense of a heightened rule, cannot be maintained on sep-
aration-of-powers grounds. 
A. Constitutional Foundations for Concern 
In rejecting a separation-of-powers justification for what he calls a 
"superstrong presumption of statutory stare decisis," William Es-
kridge attacks the view that the Constitution has something to say 
about the degree to which judges may make law in the course of inter-
preting statutes.193 As a preliminary matter, he argues that the judi-
cial legislation argument is a very weak "formalist" approach that has 
no basis in the constitutional text. 194 The argument is certainly too 
weak, in Eskridge's view, to support a "radical transformation in the 
Court's stare decisis practice," a transformation he believes would be 
necessary because anything close to an absolute rule of statutory stare 
decisis would be "inconsistent with the Court's actual practice of over-
ruling statutory precedents quite frequently." 195 
The theory Eskridge attacks is a straw man. The call for an abso-
lute rule of statutory stare decisis is not an absolute "formalist" claim 
that the Constitution strictly compels such an approach or condemns 
all others. Eskridge's truism that the Constitution "does not set forth 
any standards for stare decisis" 19 6 is quite beside the point. To the 
extent that the Constitution speaks to the issue, it speaks not to the 
192. "Even though the Constitution explicitly puts the legislative power in Congress, judicial 
legislation is so deeply established that the legal profession takes it for granted, as though nature 
provided it." Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research 
Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, I (1986). 
193. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1397-400. 
194. Id. at 1398; see also Eskridge, supra note 95, at 1498-501. 
195. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1398. 
196. Id. 
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narrow principle of statutory stare decisis, but to the broader principle 
of discouraging judicial lawmaking. Constitutional arguments relating 
to separation of powers often deal with structural themes in the Con-
stitution, as opposed to individual clauses that prohibit or require spe-
cific practices.197 Moreover, the proposal for an absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis does not call for courts to strike down popularly 
enacted measures as unconstitutional, in which case the demand for 
specific textual support in the constitution would be reasonable. It 
simply urges that the nonmajoritarian aspect of judicial lawmaking 
should have a "conditioning infiuence"198 in the Court's formulation 
of stare decisis rules. 199 Such a proposition surely does not need a 
specific text upon which to base its legitimacy. 
Seen in this light, there is little force to the argument that the 
courts have no right to develop a rule of statutory interpretation 
designed to induce Congress to review statutory interpretations. Hart 
and Sacks seem to condemn a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis 
as "a statement from one coordinate branch of the Federal Govern-
ment to another about how the other shall perform its official func-
tions. "200 Similarly, Aleinikoff argues that such efforts to shape 
legislative behavior are "at war" with the desire to avoid the judicial 
activism that fuels them in the first place.201 These attacks miss the 
mark. In crafting canons of interpretation, it is wholly legitimate for 
courts to seek to ensure the legitimacy of their own role in the legisla-
tive/interpretive process.202 No one is forcing Congress to do any-
197. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 
433 U.S. 425 (1977); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
198. Merrill, supra note 136, at 70. 
199. One interesting question is why the very proposal advanced here is not foreclosed, on its 
own terms, by the Court's earlier decisions in this area. In other words, why aren't the Court's 
earlier statutory stare decisis decisions immune from change under an absolute rule of statutory 
stare decisis? There are two responses. First, the lack of a consistent approach to stare decisis 
makes it impossible to tell exactly what approach the Court has taken (although it is clear that 
the Court has not adopted an absolute rule). Second, and more important, the question of an 
appropriate approach to statutory stare decisis is not simply a matter of statutory interpretation 
- it implicates the role of the federal courts in the constitutional system. As such, it should not 
be subject to the rule proposed for matters of pure statutory interpretation. 
200. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 46, at 1402 (referring to reenactment cases); see also 
Grabow, supra note 42. 
201. Aleinikoff, supra note 80, at 32. 
202. The notion that canons of construction ought to be designed to put pressure on Con· 
gress to do its job is not unprecedented. Justice Frankfurter, for example, recognized the frailties 
of the legislative process, but nonetheless objected to "loose judicial reading" of statutes: "The 
pressure on legislatures to discharge their responsibility with care, understanding and imagina-
tion should be stiffened, not relaxed. Above all, they must not be encouraged in irresponsible and 
undisciplined use of language." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 41 
CoLUM. L. REv. 527, 545-46 (1947). 
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thing - the courts are simply announcing how they will continue to 
interpret the statute in Congress' silence. 
If explicit constitutional language is needed to support this ap-
proach, however, the first words of article I provide it. "All legislative 
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representa-
tives. "203 Eskridge dismisses the import of this edict by arguing that 
although the section restricts "legislative powers" to Congress, 
"[n]owhere does the Constitution say that Congress shall have all law-
making power."204 What is one to make of this semantic argument? 
Is it possible that the Constitution merely precludes judges from mak-
ing law through formally passing statutes, but presents no restriction 
to judges making law through other less formal means? Granted, 
there is some question about just how strictly this constitutional lan-
guage should be construed. 205 It is quite mistaken, though, to con-
strue it in such a narrow and artificial sense that it loses all ·significance 
as a meaningful grant of exclusive authority to the legislature, and as a 
material restraint on the power of the other branches. 
Eskridge's more powerful point moves away from his demand for 
chapter and verse and argues that nothing about the constitutional 
system of separation of powers disapproves of judicial involvement in 
the lawmaking process. He points out that the federal courts have 
long engaged in the creation of a federal common law, and that the 
Constitution itself has been interpreted to assign this role to the judici-
ary in some areas. Obviously, any theory questioning the legitimacy of 
subtle judicial lawmaking through statutory interpretation must come 
to terms with the explicit lawmaking that federal judges engage in 
when crafting a federal common law.206 
203. U.S. CONST. art. 1, cl. 1. 
204. Eskridge, supra note 95, at 1499. In support of this crabbed view of the words, Eskridge 
asserts that the "commonly accepted meaning of 'legislative Powers' - in 1789 as well as of 
today - is the power to enact statutes." Id. 
205. Compare id. at 1499-500 with Merrill, supra note 140. 
206. The specification of federal judges and federal common law is purposeful, for it is imper-
ative to distinguish between the broad role state courts have in shaping their state's common law 
and the far more limited role the federal courts may legitimately occupy. The Constitution's 
structure of separated powers that limits the federal courts' lawmaking authority does not con-
trol the functions of state courts. Cf Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 
(1937) ("How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, 
if not always, a question for the state itself."). Indeed, many state constitutions explicitly con-
template that state courts will share consiqerable power with state legislatures. Moreover, the 
fact that so many state judges are accountable to the electorate substantially mitigates some of 
the countermajoritarian difficulties that plague the federal courts. (Of course, state court ac-
countability creates some difficulties as well. See Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence 
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986)). Calabresi ignores these 
fundamental distinctions between state and federal judges when he claims that the traditional 
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The theory advanced here - that judicial lawmaking is appropri-
ate only when necessary to the function of adjudicating cases - does 
not necessarily condemn judicial involvement in shaping federal com-
mon law. Federal common law serves to fill gaps left in the body of 
laws that the legislature has enacted,207 and in this sense, is similar to 
the process of filling the gaps in statutes Congress has passed. "The 
difference between 'common law' and 'statutory interpretation' is a 
difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind."208 In both 
cases, Congress often has not spoken to the issue in any discernible 
manner, and it is not feasible to proceed to adjudicate a case without 
formulating an appropriate rule to govern. A theory that expresses 
concern about the judicial lawmaking inherent in much statutory in-
terpretation is surely concerned about the legitimacy of federal com-
mon law, but unless that theory condemns all lawmaking through 
interpretation, consistency does not demand that it condemn all law-
making through common law.209 
The comparison between statutory interpretation and federal com-
mon law is important, though, for it demonstrates the inconsistency of 
demanding an absolute rule of stare decisis in statutory cases while not 
insisting upon a similar rule with respect to federal common-law prec-
edents. If the type of judicial choice between alternative constructions 
that occurs in statutory interpretation is a function that the judiciary 
ought to perform as seldom as possible, and in a way that best pro-
motes legislative oversight, then open-ended judicial creation of fed-
eral common law certainly ought to be carried out within these same 
limitations.210 
model of common-law lawmaking justifies federal courts' ignoring legislative enactments. See G. 
CALABRESI, supra note 40, at ch. 4. 
207. As Merrill defines it: " 'Federal common law[ ]'. .. means any federal rule of decision 
that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text - whether or not that rule 
can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or an unconventional 
sense." Merrill, supra note 140, at 5 (emphasis omitted); see also Field, Sources of Law: Tire 
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890-96 (1986). 
208. Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After tire Death of Diversity, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 311, 332 (1980). But see Redish, Federal Common Law, supra note 115 (rejecting argu-
ment that development of federal common law and statutory interpretation are similar in this 
regard). 
209. Moreover, even if Eskridge is correct in arguing that article III specifically envisions 
that federal courts will make common law in some subject areas, such as admiralty and disputes 
between states, it has little relevance to the power of the courts in other areas. Nor does it justify 
dismissing all concern about the courts' role even in these specific subject matters. That courts 
may have the power does not define the way, or the areas, in which they should exercise it. 
210. This proposal to extend the absolute rule of stare decisis to the Supreme Court's federal 
common-law decisions might seem a bit drastic until it is recognized how few cases this class 
includes. It is surely not unrealistic to expect Congress to monitor the handful of federal com-
mon-law decisions the Supreme Court issues each year. 
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Similarly, there is no room to vary the weight of stare decisis ac-
cording to different types of legislative enactments. Justice Stevens, 
for example, has drawn a distinction between typical statutes and stat-
utes that are phrased in "sweeping, general terms, expecting the fed-
eral courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-
case basis in the common law tradition."211 In these common law-like 
statutes, Justice Stevens, and perhaps other Members of the Court,212 
believes that the typical rule of heightened statutory stare decisis 
should be relaxed. But the judicial legislation argument in favor of an 
absolute rule of statutory stare decisis admits no exception for com-
mon law-like statutes. As with federal common law itself, the lack of 
strict standards to govern the courts' decisions interpreting these kinds 
of statutes serves to heighten - not to lessen - the concern with 
judicial lawmaking. It is with respect to federal common law and 
common law-like statutes that the lawmaking role of the court is at its 
pinnacle. 
B. Mini-Delegations 
Dean Guido Calabresi also argues that there are no constitutional 
impediments to judicial creativity in statutory interpretation. This is 
certainly true, he argues, where there is an explicit delegation of au-
thority from the legislature, and perhaps even where there is not.213 
Indeed, in defending his "common-law" approach to statutory inter-
pretation, which allows judges to ignore statutes they consider obso-
lete, 214 Calabresi boasts that he "cannot take a constitutional objection 
very seriously."215 This casual dismissal of the constitutional difficul-
ties inherent in judicial lawmaking is made possible only by Calabresi's 
broad view of Congress' authority to delegate legislative power. He 
suggests that the only impermissible delegations are those that occur 
when the legislature diminishes its "ultimate responsibility to the peo-
ple for the enactment of constitutionally dubious laws."216 
This characterization of the appropriate nondelegation standard 
seems odd in light of Calabresi's own explanation that the "limits the 
Constitution has imposed on . . . delegation have been those deemed 
211. Guardian's Assn. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also Rogers, supra note 176, at 630-32. 
212. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 33 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Eskridge 
lists a number of cases in which the Court appears to have taken a similar approach. See Es-
kridge, supra note 36, at 1376-81. 
213. G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 114-17. 
214. See supra note 91. 
215. G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 114. 
216. Id. at 115. 
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necessary to keep legislatures from ducking the responsibility of an-
swering to the people."217 It is difficult to understand why proximity 
to a substantive constitutional matter should be the only relevant fac-
tor in assessing whether the legislature has abdicated its responsibility 
to govern. There are certainly hard political choices in other areas 
that Congress and the President would prefer to delegate as well. As 
one member of Congress stated in an oft-quoted remark: "When hard 
decisions have to be made, we pass the buck to the agencies with 
vaguely worded statutes."218 That the legislature and President may 
willingly agree to delegate their authority is no surprise and does not 
counsel in favor of allowing delegations. The natural temptation to 
abdicate responsibility and "accountability is precisely the reason for 
a nondelegation doctrine."219 
Even if one accepts Calabresi's toothless delegation doctrine with 
respect to administrative delegations, however, it does not follow that 
the Constitution tolerates similar delegations to the judiciary. As 
Thomas Merrill has argued, part of the saving grace of a delegation to 
an agency whose officials are answerable to the President is the indi-
rect electoral accountability of these decisionmakers.22° Federal 
judges, on the other hand, are not answerable in this manner. Accord-
ingly, "the example of wholesale lawmaking by independent and exec-
utive-branch agencies is distinguishable on grounds both of federalism 
and of electoral accountability."221 
Merrill suggests that this electoral accountability extends to 
agency officials who "are either appointed or removable by the Presi-
dent. "222 Although it is clear that removability amounts to some de-
gree of accountability,223 it is doubtful that the fact of presidential 
appointment independently achieves any degree of accountability. If it 
did, then article III judges might also be considered electorally ac-
countable since they, too, are appointed by the President. As a general 
matter, it appears reasonable to conclude that "[o]nce an officer is ap-
pointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the au-
217. Id. at 114-15. 
218. 122 CONG. REC. Hl0,685 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (Statement of Rep. Elliott Levitas), 
quoted in J. ELY, supra note 134, at 132. 
219. J. ELY, supra note 134, at 133 (emphasis in original). See generally supra note 156 and 
accompanying text. 
220. Merrill, supra note 136, at 21-22. 
221. Id. at 21. 
222. Id. at 21-22. 
223. For an argument that the degree of accountability created by the presidential removal 
power is largely exaggerated, see Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Sub-
stance, and Administrative Independence, 15 KY. L.J. 699, 766-81 (1987). 
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thority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance 
of his functions, obey."224 
Nonetheless, under a sliding scale of accountability, federal courts 
surely must be deemed less accountable than independent agencies.225 
To begin with, agencies are far more subservient to the congressional 
budget process than are federal courts. Moreover, even unremovable 
agency commissioners enjoy only limited tenure (typically five to seven 
years), and are thus somewhat accountable to the body possessing re-
appointment authority (which is practically quite similar to the re-
moval authority).226 Federal judges, by contrast, are appointed for 
life.227 Similarly, the short term of appointment, combined with the 
practice of frequent resignations, 228 means that most commissioners 
have been more recently appointed than most federal judges (assuming 
the number of judicial positions does not increase disproportionately). 
The commissioners might then be assumed to be responsive, although 
not accountable, to the policies of more recently elected administra-
tions than are judges. 229 
To the extent these distinctions between courts and agencies are 
unconvincing, they serve to highlight the cause for concern with ex-
pansive delegations of legislative authority to the independent agen-
cies. They certainly do not support Calabresi's assertion that the 
Constitution is neutral to the prospect of legislation by the 
224. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. 
Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)). . 
225. Judge Friendly argued that this factor contributes to the attractiveness of lawmaking by 
the judiciary. Writing about Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), 
which interpreted a jurisdictional statute to afford federal courts the power to develop a body of 
federal labor law, Judge Friendly explained: 
One of the beauties of the Lincoln Mills doctrine for our day and age is that it permits 
overworked federal legislators, who must vote with one eye on the clock and the other on 
the next election, so easily to transfer a part of their load to federal judges, who have time 
for reflection and freedom from fear as to tenure and are ready, even eager, to resume their 
historic law-making function - with Congress always able to set matters right if they go too 
far off the desired beam. 
Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N:Y.U. L. REV. 383, 
419 (1964) (footnote omitted). Surprisingly absent from this discussion is any concern with sepa-
ration of powers. 
226. See L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS 38 (1969): "The [independent] regulators thus 
occupy an ill-defined and varying position in relation to the President, somewhere between the 
subordinate status of cabinet officers and the independence of judges." 
227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Even so, they too may have some incentive to shape their 
behavior to increase the probability of elevation or appointment to some other office. See Redish 
& Marshall, supra note 206, at 498-99. 
228. See Goodsell & Gayo, Appointive Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 Ao-
MIN. L. REV. 291, 300-02 (1971); B. SHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND'THE COMMISSIONS 188 
(1959). 
229. See generafly Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 
335, 351 (1974). 
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judiciary. 230 
V. CONSIDERING THE COSTS 
If an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis would have the benefi-
cial effect of increasing Congress' involvement in the process of statu-
tory interpretation, then it deserves to be considered as a method of 
minimizing, and even as part of the solution to, the counter-
majoritarian aspects of judicial lawmaking. Of course, even a doctrine 
that serves exemplary purposes may be unwelcome if its expected costs 
outweigh its expected benefits. This section of the article addresses 
some of those potential costs. 
A. Exacerbating Dysfunctions 
The theme of this article is that developing a colloquy between 
Congress and the courts on matters of statutory interpretation is an 
important goal, consistent with our democratic tradition of legislative 
supremacy. William Eskridge has argued, though, that getting Con-
gress more involved is bound to "exacerbat[e] dysfunctions that exist 
in the legislative process."231 Relying on public choice and institu-
tional process theory, he argues that a heightened rule of statutory 
stare decisis 
might overprotect interpretations benefiting well-organized interests, too 
often at the expense of the general welfare. That is, once an organized 
interest wrests a favorable interpretation from the courts ... Congress is 
unlikely to express disapproval, given the interest group's ability to mo-
bilize opposition to any effort to change the interpretation legislatively. 
Conversely, if a judicial ... interpretation hurts the interests of the same 
well-organized group, the group will often have a fighting chance to ob-
tain a legislative overruling. 232 
To avoid this, he advocates that the Court's determination of whether 
to give significance to Congress' inaction should "consider whether the 
'losers' in the initial interpretation had [and have] effective access to 
the political process to urge reconsideration. "233 
230. Moreover, even if the Court is correct in declining to use the nondelegation doctrine 
actually to strike down statutes, it does not follow that there is no general principle of lawmaking 
by the legislature that the court should seek to implement in formulating its rules of decision. 
See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text. 
231. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 104. 
232. Id. at 114. Although this passage comes from a discussion of acquiescence, Eskridge 
has made the same point with respect to statutory stare decisis. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1406-
08. For discussions of some (dated) empirical evidence supporting Eskridge's conclusion, see 
Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 
14 J. PUB. L. 377, 391-92 (1965); Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 
1945-1957, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1336-37 (1958). 
233. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 107-08. 
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Eskridge's argument is based on the very objectionable premise 
that it is legitimate for courts to shape doctrines of statutory interpre-
tation in ways that either mitigate the effects of Congress' actual deci-
sions, or try to keep issues out of the congressional arena altogether. 
In his most recent work, Eskridge concedes the tension between his 
view of the courts' role and the principle of legislative supremacy, but 
rejects the strong, formalist view of legislative supremacy as growing 
out of pluralist political theory.234 Such a view of government, hear-
gues, ignores the fact that "our constitutional history contains ele-
ments that derive both from the republican, public values tradition 
and from the liberal, pluralist tradition."235 Eskridge then proceeds to 
describe how ugly a pluralist world would be, and suggests that we 
would all enjoy living in a "community of principle" more than a com-
munity built on the "transactional ideal."236 To help bring about this 
"community of principle," Eskridge advocates that judges "bend" 
statutes to comport with "public values," even if this means "dis-
plac[ing] an apparent expectation of the enacting Congress. "237 
The most controversial aspect of Eskridge's theme is not his call 
for courts to recognize their role in promoting republican values. 
Many agree that judicial review of legislative enactments for proce-
dural and substantive constitutionality is designed, at least in part, to 
serve this function.238 The novelty is that Eskridge wants courts to 
use their positions as statutory interpreters to instill these values into 
legislative enactments.~39 Even though the legislature clearly acted 
234. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009 
(1989). 
235. Id. at 1070 (emphasis omitted). 
·236. Id. at 1070-73. 
237. Id. at 1065. Without explaining why, Eskridge concedes that judges cannot invoke pub-
lic values "to trump a clear [statutory] text and supportive legislative history." Id. at 1066. But 
he believes that only a small fraction of statutes fit that description. 
238. Cass Sunstein has written extensively on this theme. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups 
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Con-
stitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); see also Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering 
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1035 (1984). This approach is not without its critics, how-
ever, a number of whose articles appear in Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 91 
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
239. There is no per se problem in developing canons of statutory interpretation that are 
other than intent-seeking in the narrow sense. A plain meaning rule, for example, can be intent-
frustrating on the short term but might make sense as a long-term mechanism for promoting 
increased legislative accountability and democratic decisionmaking. See generally Aleinikolf, 
supra note 80, at 22-32 (discussing ways that a plain meaning rule can promote and frustrate 
intentionalist goals); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpre-
tation: An Interest Group Model, 86 .COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225 (1986) (outlining ways in which 
courts can promote legislative accountability). Indeed, an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis 
works this way as well. The difference with Eskridge's scheme is that it is not designed to pro-
mote open decisionmaking by the legislature; it is designed to embellish the judiciary's lawmak-
ing role at the expense of the legislature. 
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constitutionally in enacting a statute, Eskridge's proposals would al-
low the courts consciously to manipulate congressional intent and to 
mold the statute in a way that furthers the judges' perception of the 
public interest. 240 
On one level, "one can only respond by asking whether the Consti-
tution as it now stands envisions such sweeping rule by judges."241 
Eskridge's model cannot be defended simply by pointing out that the 
Constitution embodies some republican values. To be sure, some con-
stitutional provisions, such as bicameralism and the executive veto, 
represent attempts to decrease the influence of special interests.242 
These provisions tell us that the Constitution exhibits concern with the 
effect of factions on the legislative process, and that the Constitution 
subordinates some of the values of pure representative lawmaking to 
the goal oflimiting factional influence. But these provisions do not tell 
us that the Constitution adopts the public-interest maximizing princi-
ple as its general theme, and that all other values, such as lawmaking 
by the representative legislature, should (or may) be subordinated to 
it. Given the recognized tension between these two principles, the ex-
plicit provisions of the Constitution must be regarded as outer limits of 
the barriers to representative democracy that the Constitution toler-
ates, rather than as mere examples of the kinds of countermajoritarian 
devices that later generations might see fit to'establish. There is such a 
thing as over-enforcing a principle,243 and this is particularly harmful 
when the effect is to erode yet another principle - legislative 
supremacy - which has such strong foundations in our political heri-
tage, not to mention the constitutional text. 
The argument that an absolute rule of stare decisis gives too much 
power and responsibility to Congress is therefore quite unpersuasive. 
It is certainly mistaken to forget that legislative supremacy has its lim-
its within a constitutional democracy.244 But it is equally mistaken to 
240. Even aside from any "formalist" claims about the respective roles of the legislature and 
the courts, there are serious defects in the kind of statutory interpretation that Eskridge envi-
sions. As Eskridge himself documents, allowing judges to impose their views of "public values" 
opens the door for judges to implement values that many of us, or many other Americans, con-
sider abhorrent, without any claim to democratic or constitutional authority. See Eskridge, 
supra note 234, at 1083-91. 
241. Froomkin, Climbing The Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal 
Process (Book Review), 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1071, 1094 (1988). 
242. ?yfacey, supra note 239, at 225. 
243. Cf. Marshall, supra note 120, at 1352-53 (discussing the fallacy of over-enforcing a 
single constitutional principle to the detriment of other, equally important ones). 
244. See Ackerman, supra note 238, at 1035 (attacking modern lawyers' implicit belief that 
"there is only one place in which the political will of the American people is to be found: the 
Congress of the United States"). 
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ignore our fundamental commitment to accountable government 
within those specified constitutional limits. 
But even if one were sympatheti<? to the notion that the Court 
should develop an approach to stare decisis that would be cognizant of 
who the losers and winners under an earlier precedent were, and how 
much influence each wields, how would the court make such evalua-
tions? One of Eskridge's examples illustrates the problem. He posits 
that the reason Congress has not overruled the Court's decisions hold-
ing baseball exempt from the antitrust laws is that baseball owners are 
a "small, homogenous, and wealthy" group, the kind of group that 
public choice theorist tell us is most likely to organize. 245 On the 
other hand, "[t]hose hurt by baseball's exemption - the millions who 
bought overpriced tickets each year and watched the sport on televi-
sion - were unlikely to organize because they were generally ignorant 
of their injury and because individual stakes were very small."246 Up 
to this point, the analysis is not overly complicated, and it might be 
anticipated that a judge reasonably educated in economic theory 
would and could reach this conclusion. 
But the analysis cannot stop there, for there may be other losers 
besides the consumer. Indeed, the most obvious group of losers were 
the players, one of whom challenged baseball's reserve clause in Flood 
v. Kuhn. 247 Are baseball players not a rather "small, homogenous, 
and wealthy" group as well? Indeed, one might think that their hero 
stature in the eyes of so many Americans might give them added lob-
bying power.248 Professor Eskridge concedes that public choice the-
ory would have predicted that baseball players could effectively form 
an interest group, but he informs us of the empirical fact that although 
the Major League Player's Association was formed in 1954, it did not 
become a major force until after 1966.249 Eskridge even attempts to 
give reasons for the players' ineffectiveness: "they were just not politi-
cally alert and had substantially more allegiance to their teams (and 
hence to the owners of their teams) than to their group."250 By this 
point, there is reason to question a judge's, or a professional econo-
mist's, ability to gauge the power of losing groups. Not only must the 
245. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 106. 
246. Id. 
247. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
248. Cf Flood, 407 U.S. at 262-63 (listing eighty-eight great baseball players who, Justice 
Blackmun wrote, "have sparked the diamond and its environs and ... have provided tinder for 
recaptured thrills, for reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversation and anticipation in-
season and off-season"). 
249. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 106 & n.208. 
250. Id. 
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judge adopt a model to define losers and assess their political clout, but 
she must account for the possibility that some among us are "just not 
politically alert" and for other anomalies such as team loyalty. Can a 
judge be expected to undertake such a political, economic, sociologi-
cal, psychological, and historical inquiry with any reasonable degree of 
accuracy?251 Uiere is reason to doubt that anyone can.252 The idea of 
a court assessing which litigants Congress can be trusted with is as 
unworkable as it is counterdemocratic. 
B. The Deep Freeze 
Another theme of the opposition to an absolute rule of statutory 
stare decisis rests on the premise that Congress is incapable of taking 
over the task of reviewing and reversing statutory precedents. For ex-
ample, Dean Guido Calabresi argues that permitting only legislative 
change under our current system would send "the cornucopia of mod-
ern statutes ... into the legislative deep freeze."253 The only way that 
the legislature could be given the task without causing this "extraordi-
nary conservatism," he asserts, would be to loosen the many proce-
dural "checks and balances that create that freeze" within the halls of 
Congress. Such a move, he asserts, would represent an "extraordinary 
shift toward full majoritarianism. "254 
Calabresi surely is correct in rejecting the option of modifying the 
constitutional system of checks and balances. That system, as he ex-
plains elsewhere in his book,255 is part of the delicate constitutional 
balance between conservatism and change. Bicameralism and present-
ment, to take two examples, are not historical anomalies. They are 
prominent features of our constitutional democracy. To modify them 
would be to alter aspects of the separation of powers that are central to 
our system of government. But as long as one is committed to main-
taining the various checks and balances that contribute to legislative 
inertia and the bias toward conservatism implicit in the system, it is 
absurd to make an end run around these very limitations by allowing 
judges to effectuate changes that the Congress cannot. The fact, then, 
that an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis might lead to decreased 
overall review (by courts and Congress combined) of statutory deci-
251. There can also be difficulties in assessing who are the losers and winners of a particular 
piece of legislation. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 113, at 896 (citing disagreement among 
economic theorists on whether drivers or owners benefited from trucking regulation). 
252. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 194, at 225-26, 256-57 {discussing the extraordinary expecta-
tions that Calabresi's proposal has for judges). 
253. G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 104. 
254.- Id. 
255. Id. at 3-5. 
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sions,256 must be attributed to our general institutional conservatism. 
It ought not be condemned unless that general predisposition is 
abandoned. 
C. Clearly Wrong Decisions 
A less politically controversial objection to an absolute rule of stat-
utory stare decisis is that such a rule "would actually undermine, 
rather than subserve, legislative supremacy."257 Reed Dickerson 
makes the point this way: "The original interpretation, which by hy-
pothesis thwarted legislative intent, did not invade the legislature's 
prerogative, whereas later correction, which by hypothesis supports 
the result originally intended by. the legislature, would invade it. Does 
this make sense?"25s 
The concern that courts will be barred from overruling clearly 
wrong or unworkable precedent is valid, and it this concern that 
makes the doctrine suggested here "a hard one."259 But recognizing 
the problem does not establish whether the expected costs of courts' 
not overruling clearly wrong statutory precedents outweighs the val-
ues served by an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. Although 
there is no scientific answer to the question, the danger described may 
be less dramatic than it appears at first glance. 
Initially, it is far from clear that there are many instances of 
"clearly wrong" precedents. Before the Supreme Court rules on a 
matter of statutory interpretation it generally has already had the ben-
efit of at least two lower court decisions260 and exhaustive briefing by 
the parties and possibly amici. Indeed, because of the Court's general 
practice of awaiting circuit splits before granting certiorari on statu-
tory matters,261 there are typically far more than two decisions by 
lower courts before the Supreme Court construes a statute. Any inter-
pretation of the statute must then command a majority of the Court 
(usually five votes, but never less than four) before it triggers the abso-
lute rule of statutory stare decisis. The thoroughness of this delibera-
tive process would seem to be a significant protection against statutory 
256. It is not clear that this would be the result of an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, 
for the goal is that the courts' noninvolvement in revisiting statutory precedents will trigger 
increased legislative involvement. 
257. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1399. 
258. R. DICKERSON, supra note 46, at 253; see also Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1399; Rogers, 
supra note 176, at 624-25. 
259. E. LEVI, supra note 36, at 32. 
260. Unless the case arises ·on direct appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982), or the statutory 
issue was not raised in the initial court that decided the case. 
261. See S. EsTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 105, at 53-59. 
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constructions that can later be deemed to be objectively and decisively 
wrong. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any such case, notwithstanding the 
Court's rhetoric when overruling some precedents. For example, the 
Court has at times unearthed new legislative history and claimed that 
this evidence proved that the earlier interpretation of a statute was 
conclusively wrong. 262 Eskridge's observation that this claim "is 
sometimes a makeweight for other reasons for overruling a statutory 
precedent,"263 appears accurate. The Court's current methodology of 
interpreting precedents is not the type by which any one new piece of 
evidence is likely to prove conclusively that a precedent is wrong.264 
There appears to be a consensus that the majority of statutory inter-
pretation cases the Supreme Court deals with yield no objectively cor-
rect answers. Many of these cases require the Court to apply a statute 
to a scenario that Congress either was unable to, or chose not to, antic-
ipate. 265 Although one can dream up hypothetical cases in which the 
Court might misread the plain language, legislative history, and all 
other indicia of the enacting legislature's purpose or intent, the 
probability of this occurring is so small that the risk can easily be dis-
missed as inconsequential. 
In all likelihood, then, the claim that a decision is truly "wrong," 
does not turn on one objective, undisputable criteria. Instead, a deci-
sionmaker is more likely to consider a decision "clearly wrong" be-
cause it is based on, and depends upon, a particular method of 
statutory construction that she does not accept. This claim can only 
be made, however, if the decisionmaker is exceedingly confident that 
her own single theory of statutory interpretation is the correct one, or 
that some other theory is "clearly wrong." Justice Scalia, for example, 
has repeatedly argued that courts should look to legislative history 
only if the language of a statute is unclear, but should othenvise rest 
their decisions on the literal statutory language. 266 Does this mean 
that Justice Scalia must believe that every decision that relies on legis-
lative history to reach a result in tension with the statutory language is 
262. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (overruling 
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951)). 
263. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1375. 
264. "[T]he key to legislative history is that while many elements represent pieces in the 
puzzle, no one piece - no matter how clear and unequivocal - is alone dispositive." Population 
Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
265. See supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text. 
266. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hir-
schey v. Fed. Energy Reg. Commn., 777 F.2d l, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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"clearly wrong"? He could take this position only if he believed that 
the theory of interpretation that relied on legislative history is not only 
erroneous, but is "clearly wrong." It would be terribly arrogant for 
him to take such a position, accusing almost all of his colleagues and 
recent predecessors of having adopted a wholly senseless approach to 
statutory interpretation. But assuming hypothetically that he would 
take that position, is this the kind of clearly wrong precedent we are 
concerned about? If it is, then the door is opened for statutory prec-
edents to be overruled whenever a majority of the Court has a philoso-
phy of statutory interpretation that differs from an earlier Court's. 
Once the specter of throngs of "clearly wrong" precedents is re-
jected, it becomes apparent that a far more plausible explanation for 
the uneasiness with an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis is the 
desire that the judiciary react to changing views about the continued 
desirability (not objective correctness) of earlier decisions. Changing 
times and the value of experience are, of course, good reasons for over-
ruling statutory decisions. But it should be apparent that the task of 
evaluating them is one for the representative Congress, not for the 
judiciary. 
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the more dated and 
outlandish a precedent is, the easier it should be to trigger a congres-
sional response. Indeed, this expectation of a prompt legislative re-
sponse has inspired an approach which may be called judicial 
blackmail.267 The best recent example of this is Justice Scalia's con-
curring opinion in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Associates, 268 
where the Court selected a statute of limitations for civil RICO ac-
tions. As with many statutes, Congress passed the Act without ever 
declaring what its statute of limitations should be. Consistent with its 
recent practice in these situations, the Court sought out an appropriate 
limitations period from some other statute to "borrow" for use in 
RICO. It chose the four-year period from the civil enforcement sec-
tion of the Clayton Act.269 Justice Scalia argued that the Court had 
no right to pick and choose among analogous federal statutes, and ar-
gued that "if state codes do not furnish an 'appropriate' limitations 
267. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 538-40 (1957) (Frank-
furter J., dissenting); see generally w. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 129-31 
(1964) (discussing "trap-pass" through which Justice interprets statutes "so narrowly as to 
render them ineffective in the hopes of forcing fresh legislative action"). 
268. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). 
269. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1987). In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), by contrast, the 
Court followed the more typical path of choosing a limitations period by reference to relevant 
state statutes of limitations. See generally DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-72 
(1983). 
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period, there is none to apply."270 Obviously recognizing the ex-
traordinary nature of that result, he concluded his separate opinion 
with the quite understated speculation that his approach "might even 
prompt Congress to enact a limitations period that it believes 'appro-
priate,' a judgment far more within its competence than ours."271 The 
extreme character of the proposed position was exactly what would 
guarantee a congressional response. 272 The same reaction can be an-
ticipated if the statutory precedent that the Court declines to overrule 
is sufficiently extreme. 213 
Indeed, those who attempt to draw a morbid picture of a legal 
system incapable of responding to social and scientific change often 
seem to ignore Congress' role altogether. For example, in his recent 
article suggesting that courts should routinely "update" statutes 
through their statutory interpretations,274 T. Alexander Aleinikoff de-
scribes the Supreme Court's decision in Boutilier v. INS. 275 He ac-
cepts that the Court properly read the McCarran-Walter Act's 
legislative history, which rather emphatically demonstrated that Con-
gress intended to exclude homosexual aliens as part of a class that it 
described as "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality."276 
Nonetheless, he argues that a Court faced with the issue today should 
overrule Boutilier. But why isn't it Congress' role to change the stat-
ute if our societal vision of homosexuality has changed? And if our 
societal vision has not changed, what right does the Court have to 
270. 483 U.S. at 170 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
271. 438 U.S. at 170 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
272. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (evaluating the role of "penalty default rules"). 
273. There is, of course, nothing· wrong with the Court letting Congress know that it consid· 
ers a precedent wrong. See W. MURPHY, supra note 189 ("Dicta in an opinion can be used not 
only to persuade Congress to act or to help establish a climate of opinion in which Congress can 
act, but can also be used to try to guide the action which Congress will take."). Moreover, a 
major aspect of creating a system that uses an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis should be to 
create a congressional mechanism, such as special committees, to receive such messages from the 
Court, and otherwise to monitor judicial decisions. See supra note 183. 
274. Aleinikolf, supra note 80, at 47-54. 
275. 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (holding that homosexuals are excludable aliens under Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952). 
276. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982). An earlier version of the bill explicitly excluded aliens 
who were "homosexuals" or "sex perverts". S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1950), 
That phrase was omitted before passage, but the Judiciary Committee Report explained that this 
was done because homosexual aliens were already covered by the "psychopathic personality" 
clause. The Committee emphasized that "[t]his change of nomenclature [wa]s not to be con-
strued in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who [we]re sexual deviates.'' S. 
REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, quoted in Boutilier. 387 U.S. at 121. The Court concluded 
that this and other similar history "indicate[d] beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress 
intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals." Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 
120. Justice Douglas' lone dissent did not challenge this reading of the statute. 387 U.S. at 125 
(Douglas, J. dissenting). 
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ignore what Congress clearly intended to accomplish with this statute, 
unless it is willing to recognize that the Constitution protects an indi-
vidual's right to choose a homosexual lifestyle?277 It is hard to believe 
that the Supreme Court could reaffirm Boutilier in 1988 without trig-
gering rather instant congressional attention to the issue. Indeed, even 
if an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis would not trigger congres-
sional scrutiny of routine statutory interpretation decisions, it would 
put pressure on Congress to consider cases, such as one which reaf-
firmed Boutilier, that raise such vital issues of social policy. 
The risks of permanently perpetuating objectively "wrong" prec-
edents seems quite slight, then. And even if "the immediate objectives 
of Congress may be temporarily frustrated" in some cases, "the pro-
tection to the integrity of judicial [and legislative] institutions which 
dictates such a result will often be of far more enduring signifi-
cance."278 But if the risk of creating a permanent body of clearly 
wrong precedents is considered intolerably high under an absolute rule 
of statutory stare decisis, one could craft an approach whereby the 
Court would adhere to a heightened rule of stare decisis that allowed 
for reversals only in the exceptional case of a universally recognized, 
clearly wrong precedent. This rule, quite similar to the Court's cur-
rent rhetoric (but not its practice), could avoid perpetuating clear mis-
takes. But unless it is defined by strict and clear guidelines, it 
threatens to subvert some of the values that the absolute or heightened 
rule of statutory stare decisis is intended to serve.279 
D. The Effects on the Parties 
What of the actual parties to the judicial decision, however? 
Blackmailing Congress may successfully bring about legislative 
change, but it will often not help the individual litigants who. will lose 
their cases simply because the Court wants Congress to be the body 
that overrules undesirable statutory precedents. In light of these costs, 
the heightened rule of statutory stare decisis has been attacked as 
277. This might require the overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as 
strong a proof as any that the heightened rule of statutory stare decisis advanced in the article 
should not be extended to constitutional decisions. 
278. Wellington & Albert, supra note 76, at 1561-62. 
279. One possible procedural mechanism for enforcing a somewhat relaxed rule could be to 
require the votes of a supermajority of the Court (or even unanimity) before a statutory prece-
dent could be overruled. The Court could probably adopt such an internal rule without congres-
sional action, just as it has adopted its majority rule for decisions, its "rule of four" for certiorari 
jurisdiction, and its "rule of three" for holding petitions for disposition in light of another pend-
ing case. See Revesz & Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 
1067 (1988) (discussing various voting rules that the Court uses); Stevens, The Life Span of a 
Judge Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1983) (discussing origins of the "rule of four"). 
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holding the "temporary losers hostage until such a response [from the 
legislature] is obtained."280 This result seems especially unsettling 
when a losing party will suffer severe harm as a result of the decision, 
or where a party may lack sufficient political power to push Congress 
to bring about the result that the Court anticipates.281 
The human costs of withholding a just decision for institutional 
reasons is a tragic cost of separation of powers. Any student of the 
law can cite multiple cases where judges have bemoaned the result 
they were compelled to reach based on their reading of a statutory or 
constitutional text. The subordination of a judge's individual sense of 
justice to institutional constraints is far from a rare phenomenon, and 
will continue frequently to surface as long as we are committed to a 
system of divided powers. 282 As Alexander Bickel put it, "It will not 
do to exalt an individual claim to particular justice over all other 
problems that adjudication may have to solve and over all other conse-
quences that it entails."283 
E. Time Pressures on Congress 
One final cost needs to be addressed. Considering and sometimes 
overruling statutory precedents takes time, especially when it is Con-
gress that is doing the reconsidering and overruling. ·Hence, it has 
been argued that the absolute rule of statutory stare decisis saddles 
Congress with too time-consuming an obligation, diverting its atten-
tion from other tasks that only Congress can carry out. 284 The time-
pressure argument may well be exaggerated. To begin with, no one 
contemplates that all members of Congress will actively review all or 
even many decisions of the courts. Like almost all other legislative 
functions, committees will be heavily utilized to ease the time pres-
sures on individual members.285 Moreover, in evaluating the extra 
burdens that an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis will impose 
upon Congress, it is critical to consider the ways that rule would con-
serve congressional energy. For example, if Congress, and perhaps 
280. G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 155. 
281. Id. 
282. See A. BICKEL, supra note 134, at 173. These constraints are not limited to separation-
of-powers concerns. The Supreme Court, for example, must often refuse to hear cases even 
though a majority of the Justices believe that the result the lower court reached was wrong, and 
even unjust. See Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 17, cited in R. STEIN, E. 
GRESSMAN & s. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 881 (6th ed. 1986) {describing some 
relevant factors in deciding whether Court should grant certiorari). 
283. A. BICKEL, supra note 134, at 173. 
284. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1408. 
285. See supra note 53. 
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more importantly, interest groups, could be confident that the Court 
would not go back on its statutory interpretation, the legislature would 
never have "to go through the trouble of enacting a statute that does 
nothing more than reiterate the judicial interpretation."286 Addition-
ally, any real analysis of the burdens that rule would create needs to 
consider the burdens that the court system, especially the Supreme 
Court, would be spared under a system in which it had no opportunity 
ever to reconsider statutory precedents.287 
In any event, the time-pressure argument, to use a now worn-out 
phrase, proves too much. If it is the legislature's role to revise statutes 
and to review the courts' interpretations of statutes, time pres~ures are 
certainly no excuse for the legislature to abdicate its responsibility.288 
It hardly seems unreasonable to conclude that part of the obligation in 
passing a statute is the commitment to devote the time necessary to 
oversee its interpretation and application. 
CONCLUSION 
The notion that judges "find" law when interpreting statutes has 
long been considered a fictional account of the process. The truth is 
that even the most intentionalist of judges frequently "makes" law 
when she interprets acts of Congress. For judges who engage in some 
of the less originalist - more dynamic - approaches to statutory in-
terpretation, this lawmaking aspect of their roles is all the more obvi-
ous. Despite recognition of this reality, scant attention has been paid 
to the legitimacy of the courts' engaging in this function. 
This article's proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis 
will not solve all of the problems respecting the legitimacy of the 
courts' role. The pattern of congressional lethargy is too well estab-
lished to expect any single rule of statutory construction to change the 
relationship between the courts and the Congress. But invoking an 
absolute rule of statutory stare decisis is a step in the right direction, 
286. The Supreme Court -1986 Term, Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 287 (1987). 
287. Avoiding this type of burden is, of course, one of the classic justifications for stare deci-
sis. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 38, at 149: "[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to 
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case .... " 
288. Similar pragmatic objections have been raised with respect to Congress' inability to deal 
effectively with the impeachment process of federal judges. See McConnell, Reflections on the 
Senate's Role in the Impeachment Process and Proposals for Change, 76 KY. L.J. 739 (1987-
1988); Heflin & Mathias, Is Congress Up to Its Constitutional Job of Judging Judges?, N.Y. 
Times, July 31, 1988, at ES, col. 1. Yet, these pragmatic considerations obviously must be 
subordinated to Congress' constitutional duties and to the values served by legislative involve-
ment in the impeachment process. 
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and if accompanied by other steps stimulating colloquy between the 
branches, can help restore the concept of practical, not just theoretical, 
legislative supremacy. 
